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ABSTRACT
Essays on Risk Pricing in Insurance
BY
Qiheng Guo
May 21th, 2018
Committee Chair: Daniel Bauer
Major Academic Unit: Department of Risk Management and Insurance
Pricing risks in the insurance business is an essential task for actuaries. Implementing the ap-
propriate pricing techniques to improve risk management and optimize its financial gain requires a
thorough understanding of underlying risks and their interactions. In this dissertation, I address risk
pricing in the context of insurance company by reviewing methods applied in practice, proposing
new models, and also exploring different aspects of insurance risks.
This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter provides a survey of existing
capital allocation methods, including common approaches based on the gradients of risk measures
and “economic” allocation arising from counterparty risk aversion. All methods are implemented
in two example settings: binomial losses and using loss realizations from a catastrophe reinsurer.
The stability of allocations is assessed based on sensitivity analysis with regards to losses. The
results show that capital allocations appear to be intrinsically (geometrically) related, although
the stability varies considerably. Stark differences exist between common and “economic” capital
allocations.
The second chapter develops a dynamic profit maximization model for a financial institution
with liabilities of varying maturity, and uses it for determining the term structure of capital costs.
iii
As a key contribution, the theoretical, numerical, and empirical results show that liabilities with
different terms are assessed differently, depending on the company’s financial situation. In partic-
ular, for a financially constrained firm, value-adjustments due to financial frictions for liabilities in
the far future are less pronounced than for short-term obligations, resulting in a strongly downward
sloping term structure. The findings provide guidance for performance measurement in financial
institutions.
The third chapter estimates a flexible affine stochastic mortality model based on a set of US term
life insurance prices using a generalized method of moments approach to infer forward-looking,
market-based mortality trends. The results show that neither mortality shocks nor stochasticity in
the aggregate trend seem to affect the prices. In contrast, allowing for heterogeneity in the mortality
rates across carriers is crucial. The major conclusion is that for life insurance, rather than aggregate
mortality risk, the key risks emanate from the composition of the portfolio of policyholders. These
findings have consequences for mortality risk management and emphasize important directions of
mortality-related actuarial research.
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Chapter 1
Capital Allocation Techniques: Review and
Comparison1
1.1 Introduction
The question of how to allocate risk capital to different units or lines of business has generated
considerable attention in the actuarial literature. This chapter reviews the form and the intellectual
foundation of a variety of methods, and then compares their results in the context of a theoretical
loss model and a specific real-world example. The goal is to offer insights on the similarities,
differences, and stability of the different methods.
We find considerable variation in the results from different methods, although all of the alloca-
tions appear to be geometrically related. More precisely, depending on the example, the allocations
seem to constitute a lower-dimensional manifold relative to the dimension of the allocation prob-
lem. Expected value allocations lie at one end of the frontier while extreme tail allocations are at
the other. Furthermore, we also find significant differences in stability. Small changes in the un-
derlying dataset can have dramatic effects on the allocation results associated with certain methods.
In particular, allocations generated by Value-at-Risk (VaR) as well as those generated by extreme
1This essay is co-authored with Daniel Bauer and George Zanjani. We gratefully acknowledge funding from the Casualty
Actuarial Society (CAS) Committee on the Theory of Risk (COTOR) under the project “Allocation of Costs of Holding Capital.” In
particular, we are indebted to Richard Derrig for his insights and his support. We are grateful for helpful comments from Stephen
Mildenhall and Ajay Subramanian. Parts of this essay are taken from the CAS report “The Marginal Cost of Risk in a Multi-Period
Risk Model”, particularly Sections 1, 2, and 4.2.
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tail risk measures prove to be unstable due to their focus on a small number (in the case of VaR,
just one) sample outcomes.
There are various surveys on capital allocation techniques and methods (Burkett et al., 2001;
Albrecht, 2004; Venter, 2004; Bauer and Zanjani, 2013). It is important to stress that, in this
chapter, we are not attempting to endorse or favor any particular method. While we have writ-
ten elsewhere on the origins of “economic allocations” from a theoretical perspective (Bauer and
Zanjani, 2016, 2018), the goal here is to gain perspective on practical differences. To elaborate,
theoretical differences between two methods are less concerning if, in practice, they produce simi-
lar answers. Moreover, a theoretically appealing method is of little use if, in practice, it is unstable.
Thus, we view the comparison of different allocation methods as a worthwhile endeavor to inform
practice.
The rest of this essay is organized as follows. We start in Section 1.2 by reviewing the founda-
tions of the capital allocation problem. In particular, we address the question of why—or, rather,
under which conditions—the capital allocation problem is relevant, and what precisely we mean
by a capital allocation. Section 1.3 then provide details on how capital is allocated. We commence
by discussing the most popular conventional allocation approach, the so-called Euler or Gradient
allocation principle, including its economic underpinnings. However, we also review alternative
approaches, including so-called “distance minimizing” approaches, allocation by percentile layers,
and “economic allocations” originating from counterparty risk aversion. We discuss relationships
between the methods. We present a pedagogical allocation exercise illustrating the connections
between “economic” methods and conventional methods in Section 1.5. In Section 1.6, we then
implement all allocation methods in the context of data provided from a catastrophe reinsurer.
We first describe the data and the specifics of the approaches. We then discuss and compare the
resulting allocations and test their stability. Finally, Section 1.7 concludes.
2
1.2 The Foundations of Capital Allocation
1.2.1 Why Allocate Capital?
We must first establish why we allocate capital. The simple answer from the practitioner side is
that allocation is a necessity for pricing and performance measurement. When setting benchmarks
for lines of business within a multi-line firm, one must ensure that the benchmarks put in place are
consistent with the firm’s financial targets, specifically the target return on equity.
This seems logical at first glance, yet some of the academic literature has been skeptical.
Phillips et al. (1998) noted that a “financial” approach to pricing insurance in a multi-line firm
rendered capital allocation unnecessary, a point reiterated by Sherris (2006). The “financial”
approach relies on applying the usual arbitrage-free pricing techniques in a complete market setting
without frictional costs. In such a setting, one simply pulls out a market consistent valuation
measure to calculate the fair value of insurance liabilities. Capital affects this calculation in the
sense that the amount of capital influences the extent to which insurance claims are actually paid in
certain states of the world, but, so long as the actuary is correctly evaluating the extent of claimant
recoveries in various states of the world (including those where the insurer is defaulting), there is
no need to apportion the capital across the various lines of insurance.
Once frictional costs of capital are introduced, the situation changes, as seen in Froot and
Stein (1998), Zanjani (2002, 2010), and Bauer and Zanjani (2013, 2016, 2018). Frictions open up
a gap between the expected profits produced by “financial” insurance prices and the targeted level
of profits for the firm. In such a case, the “gap” becomes a cost that must be distributed back to
business lines, like overhead or any other common cost whose distribution to business lines is not
immediately obvious.
As a practical example, consider catastrophe reinsurers. Natural catastrophe risk is often ar-
gued to be “zero beta” in the sense of being essentially uncorrelated with broader financial markets.
If we accept this assessment, basic financial theory such as the CAPM would then imply that a mar-
ket rate of return on capital exposed to such risk would be the risk-free rate. Yet, target ROEs at
these firms are surely well in excess of the risk-free rate. The catastrophe reinsurer thus has the
problem of allocating responsibility for hitting the target ROE back to its various business lines
3
without any guidance from the standard arbitrage-free pricing models.
Viewed in this light, “capital allocation” is really shorthand for “capital cost allocation.” Cap-
ital itself, absent the segmentation of business lines into separate subsidiaries, is available for all
lines to consume. A portion allocated to a specific line is not in any way segregated for that line’s
exclusive use. Hence, the real consequence of allocation lies in the assignment of responsibility
for capital cost: A line allocated more capital will have higher target prices.
An important point, to which we shall return later, is the economic meaning of the allocation.
Merton and Perold (1993) debunk the notion that allocations could be used to guide business
decisions involving inframarginal or supramarginal changes to a risk portfolio (e.g., entering or
exiting a business line). The more common argument is that allocation is a marginal concept—
offering accurate guidance on small, infinitesimal changes to a portfolio. As we will see, many
methods do indeed have a marginal interpretation, but the link to marginal cost is not always a
strong one.
1.2.2 Capital Allocation Defined
We first start with notation and by defining capital allocation.2 Consider a one period model with
N business lines with loss realizations L(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ N, modeled as square-integrable random-
variables in an underlying probability space (Ω,F ,P). At the beginning of the period, the insurer
decides on a quantity of exposure in each business line and receives a corresponding premium p(i),
1 ≤ i ≤ N , in return. The exposure is an indemnity parameter q(i), so that the actual exposure to
loss i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} is:
I(i) = I(i)(L(i), q(i)).
We assume that an increase in exposure shifts the distribution of the claim random variable so that
the resulting distribution has first order stochastic dominance over the former:
P
(
I(i)(L(i), qˆ(i)) ≥ z) ≥ P (I(i)(L(i), q(i)) ≥ z) ∀z ≥ 0, qˆi ≥ qi.
2This subsection and the next borrows notation and approaches from Bauer and Zanjani (2013).
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For simplicity, we typically consider q(i) representing an insurance company’s quota share of a
customer i’s loss:
I(i) = L(i) × q(i).
Other specifications could be considered, but the specification above implies that the claim dis-
tribution is homogeneous with respect to the choice variable q(i). This simplifies capital alloca-
tion, although it should be noted that insurance claim distributions are not always homogeneous
(Mildenhall, 2004), and the “adding up” property associated with a number of methods depends
on homogeneity. Extensions to more general (non-linear) contracts are possible when generalizing
the setting (Frees, 2017; Mildenhall, 2017).
We denote company assets as a and capital as k, where to fix ideas we adopt a common spec-
ification of the difference between the fair value of assets and the present value of claims. We
denote by I the aggregate claims for the company, with the sum of the random claims over the
sources adding up to the total claim:
N∑
i=1
I(i) = I.
However, actual payments made only amount to min{I, a} because of the possibility of default.
We can also decompose actual payments, where the typical assumption in the literature is of equal
priority in bankruptcy, so that the payment to loss i is:
min
{
I(i),
a
I
I(i)
}
⇒
N∑
i=1
min
{
I(i),
a
I
I(i)
}
= min{I, a}.
Allocation is simply a division of the company’s capital or assets across the N sources of
risk, with k(i) representing the capital per unit of exposure assigned to the i-th source (and a(i)
representing a similar quantity for assets). Of course, a full allocation requires that the individual
amounts assigned to each of the lines “add up” to the total amount for the company:
N∑
i=1
q(i) k(i) = k and
N∑
i=1
q(i) a(i) = a.
It is worth noting that the question of what to allocate is not necessarily straightforward. Are
5
we to allocate the book value of equity? The market value of equity? Assets? In general, the
answer to this question is going to be guided by the nature of costs faced by the firm. Even then,
the costs may be difficult to define, as the decomposition of capital costs offered by Mango (2005)
suggests.
1.3 Capital Allocation Techniques
Assuming we have answered the question of what to allocate, the remaining question is how to do
it. Unfortunately, the answer is not straightforward: There is a bewildering variety of peddlers in
the capital allocation market. Mathematicians bearing axioms urge us to adhere to their methods—
failure to do so will result in some immutable law of nature being violated. Economists assure
us that only their methods are “optimal.” Game theorists insist that only their solution concepts
can be trusted. Practitioners wave off all of the foregoing as the raving of ivory tower lunatics,
all the while assuring us that only their methods are adapted to the “real world” problems faced by
insurance companies. Everyone has a “pet method,” perhaps one that has some intuitive appeal, or
one that is perfectly adapted to some particular set of circumstances.
Given such variety, it is not surprising that allocation methods defy easy categorization. Many
do end up in essentially the same place—the so-called Euler or Gradient Principle—a convergence
noted by Urban et al. (2004) and Albrecht (2004). But others do not. In the following, we attempt
to give an overview on the primary approaches. We keep the focus on concepts and examples. At
the end of the section, we present in Table 1.1 a summary of the allocation examples and Figure
1.1 showing their relationship.
1.3.1 The Euler Method and Some Different Ways to Get There
Consider setting capitalization based on a differentiable risk measure ρ(I) = k and further imagine
allocating capital to line i based on:
k(i) =
∂ρ(I)
∂q(i)
. (1.1)
This allocation is commonly referred to as gradient or Euler allocation, the latter being a ref-
6
erence to Euler’s homogeneous function theorem. This theorem states that for every positive
homogeneous function of degree one (q(1), . . . , q(N)) 7→ ρ(q(1), . . . , q(N))—which is equivalent
to requiring that the risk measure ρ(I) = ρ(
∑
i q
(i) L(i)) be homogeneous—we automatically ob-
tain the “adding up” property: ρ(I) =
∑N
i=1 q
(i) ∂ρ(I)
∂q(i)
. The basic Euler approach can be found in
Schmock and Straumann (1999) and Tasche (2004), among others.
The Euler or gradient allocation can also be implemented without requiring that ρ(I) = k by
normalizing:
k(i)
k
=
∂ρ(I)
∂q(i)
ρ(I)
. (1.2)
One of the major advantages of the Euler allocation is that it is possible to directly calculate (ap-
proximative) allocations given that one has an Economic Capital framework available that allows
to derive ρ(I) and k.3 More specifically, we can approximate the derivative occurring in the al-
location rule by simple finite differences (although more advanced approaches may be used), that
is:
∂ρ(I)
∂q(i)
≈ ρ(I + ∆L
(i))− ρ(I)
∆
, (1.3)
where ∆ > 0 is “small.”
A number of different paths lead to the Euler allocation. Denault (2001) proposes a set of
axioms that define a coherent capital allocation principle when ρ(I) = k. His axioms required:
1. Adding up – The sum of allocations must be k.
2. No undercut – Any sub-portfolio would require more capital on a stand-alone basis.
3. Symmetry – If risk A and risk B yield the same contribution to capital when added to any
disjoint subportfolio, their allocations must coincide.
4. Riskless allocation – A deterministic risk receives zero allocation in excess of its mean (see
also Panjer (2002)).
3This is not at all to say that this task is simple. In fact, the computational complexity associated with evaluating economic
capital presents a serious problem for financial institutions and frequently leads them to adopt second-best calculation techniques
(Bauer et al., 2012). However, the availability of a suitable model for the different risk within a company’s portfolio and their
interplay clearly is a necessity for the derivation for any coherent allocation of capital.
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Denault shows that the risk measure must necessarily be linear in order for a coherent alloca-
tion to exist. This result essentially echoes the findings of Merton and Perold (1993), but shows
that allocation based on a linear risk measure constitutes an exception to their indictment of using
allocations to evaluate inframarginal or supramarginal changes to a portfolio. Linear risk measures
are obviously of limited application, but Denault (2001) finds more useful results when analyzing
marginal changes in the portfolio. In particular, he uses five axioms to define a “fuzzy” coher-
ent allocation principle that exists for any given coherent, differentiable risk measure—and this
allocation is given by the Euler principle applied to the supplied risk measure.
Kalkbrener (2005) uses a different set of axioms:
1. Linear aggregation – Which combines axioms 1 and 4 of Denault.
2. Diversification – Which corresponds to axiom 2 of Denault.
3. Continuity – Small changes to the portfolio should only have a small effect on the capital
allocated to a subportfolio.
He finds that the unique allocation under these axioms is given by the Gaˆteaux derivative in the
direction of the subportfolio, which again collapses to the Euler allocation:
k(i) = lim
ε→0
ρ(I + εL(i))− ρ(I)
ε
=
∂ρ(I)
∂q(i)
.
Some common homogeneous risk measures used in this axiomatic context are:
• Standard Deviation – derived from the so-called standard deviation premium principle (De-
prez and Gerber, 1985);
• Value-at-Risk (VaR);
• Expected Shortfall (ES)/Tail Value at Risk (TVaR);
• Risk-Adjusted TVaR (RTVaR) – Furman and Landsman (2006) and under a different name
in Venter (2010);
• Exponential risk measure – Venter et al. (2006);
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• Distortion risk measures (Denneberg, 1990; Wang, 1996)
– Proportional hazards transform (Wang, 1995, 1998);
– Wang transform (Wang, 2000).
An alternative approach to the capital allocation problem is from the perspective of game the-
ory. Lemaire (1984) and Mango (1998) both note the potential use of the Shapley Value, which
rests on a different set of axioms, in solving allocation problems in insurance. The Shapley
Value (Shapley, 1953) is a solution concept for cooperative games that assigns each player a unique
share of the cost. Denault (2001) formally applies this idea to the capital allocation problem, in
particular by relying on the theory of fuzzy cooperative games introduced by Aubin (1981). The
key idea here is that the cost functional c of a cooperative game is defined via the risk measure ρ:
c(q(1), q(2), . . . , q(N)) = ρ(q(1), q(2), . . . , q(N)).
The problem is then to allocate shares of this “cost” to the players, with the set of valid solutions
being defined as (see also Tsanakas and Barnett (2003)):
C =
{
(k(1), k(2), . . . , k(N))
∣∣c(q(1), q(2), . . . , q(N)) = ∑ k(i) q(i)
& c(u) ≥
∑
k(i) ui, u ∈ [0, q(1)]× . . .× [0, q(N)]
}
.
Thus, for allocations in this set, any (fractional) subportfolio will feature an increase in aggregated
per-unit costs, which connects to the usual solution concept in cooperative games requiring any
solution to be robust to defections by subgroups of the players. The Aumann-Shapley solution is:
k(i) =
∂
∂ui
∫ 1
0
c(γ u) dγ
∣∣∣∣
uj=q(j) ∀j
.
If the risk measure is subadditive, positively homogeneous, and differentiable, the solution boils
down to the Euler method when loss distributions are homogeneous.4
4Aumann-Shapley values can also be used to cope with the problem of inhomogeneous loss distributions. In this case, Powers
(2007) demonstrates that although the Euler principle will not apply, the Aumann-Shapley value can be used for the risk-allocation
problem. Similarly, it may offer a solution if the underlying risk measure does not satisfy the homogeneity condition. For instance,
Tsanakas (2009) shows how to allocate capital with convex risk measures, although the absence of homogeneity is shown to
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The Euler method is also recovered in a number of “economic” approaches to capital allocation,
where the risk measure is either embedded as a constraint in a profit maximization problem (e.g.,
Meyers (2003) or Stoughton and Zechner (2007)) or embedded in the preferences of policyholders
(Zanjani, 2002). In either case, the marginal cost of risk ends up being defined in part by the
gradient of the risk measure. To illustrate, consider the optimization problem adapted from Bauer
and Zanjani (2016):
max
k,q(1),q(2),...,q(N)
{ N∑
i=1
p(i)(q(i))− V (min{I, a})− C
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Π
(1.4)
subject to
ρ(q(1), q(2), . . . , q(N)) ≤ k.
From the optimality conditions associated with this problem, assuming a non-explosive solution
exists, one can obtain:
∂Π
∂q(i)
=
(
−∂Π
∂k
)
× ∂ρ
∂q(i)
(1.5)
at the optimal exposures and capital level. Hence, for the optimal portfolio, the risk adjusted
marginal return
∂Π
∂q(i)
∂ρ
∂q(i)
for each exposure i is the same and equals the cost of a marginal unit of
capital −∂Π
∂k
. More to the point, the right hand side of (1.5) allocates a portion of the marginal cost
of capital to the i-th risk, an allocation that is obviously equivalent to the Euler allocation. In this
sense, the Euler allocation is indeed “economic,” but it is important to stress that any economic
content flows from the imposition of a risk measure constraint.
1.3.2 Distance-Minimizing Allocations
Not all approaches lead to the Euler principle. Laeven and Goovaerts (2004), whose work was later
extended by Dhaene et al. (2003) and Dhaene et al. (2012), derive allocations based on minimizing
a measure of the deviations of losses from allocated capital. Specifically, Laeven and Goovaerts
potentially produce an incentive for infinite fragmentation of portfolios. The intuition for this rather undesirable feature are risk
aggregation penalties within inhomogeneous convex risk measures.
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propose solving:
 mink(1),k(2),...,k(N) ρ
(∑N
i=1
(
I(i)(L(i), q(i))− q(i) k(i))+) ,
s.th.
∑N
i=1 q
(i) k(i) = k,
to identify an allocation, whereas Dhaene et al. (2012) consider:
 mink(1),k(2),...,k(N)
∑N
i=1 q
(i)E
[
θ(i)D
(
I(i)(L(i),q(i))
q(i)
− k(i)
)]
,
s.th.
∑N
i=1 q
(i) k(i) = k,
where D is a (distance) measure and θ(i) are weighting random variables with E[θ(i)] = 1.
In the approach by Dhaene et al. (2012), certain choices for D and θ(i) can reproduce various
allocation methods. For instance, for D(x) = x2 and k =
∑
E[θ(i)I(i)], they arrive at so-called
weighted risk capital allocations k(i) = E[θ(i)L(i)] studied in detail by Furman and Zitkis (2008).
Examples include the allocation based on the Esscher transform and the premium principle by
Kamps (1998). Other choices lead to other allocation principles, including several that can be
derived from the application of the Euler principle such as weighted TVaR (WTVaR).
1.3.3 Allocations by Co-Measures and the RMK Algorithm
Euler methods require calculation of gradient of risk measures, which sometimes can present a
numerical challenge. An alternative approach is the Ruhm-Mango-Kreps (RMK) algorithm (Ruhm
et al., 2003; Kreps, 2005), a popular approach of capital allocation in practice, partly due to its
ease of implementation. According to Kreps (2005), it commences by defining k =
∑
i q
(i) k(i) =
E[I] + R as the total capital to support the company’s aggregate loss I , where E[I] is the mean
(reserve) and R is the risk load. Then the capital allocations q(i) k(i) for risks i emanating from the
asset or the liability side are defined as:
q(i) k(i) = E[I(i)] +Ri
= E
[
I(i)
]
+ E
[(
I(i) − E[I(i)]) φ(I)] , (1.6)
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where φ is the riskiness leverage, and “all” that one needs to do is to find the appropriate form of
φ. This allocation method adds up by definition, it scales with a currency change if φ(λx) = φ(x)
for a positive constant λ.
Different interpretations are possible, but key advantage ease of implementation since it solely
relies on taking “weighted averages” (Ruhm, 2013):
Algorithm 1. RMK Algorithm
• Simulate possible outcomes by component and total.
• Calculate expected values E[I(i)] by taking simple averages.
• Select a risk measure on total company outcomes and express the risk measure as leverage
factors.
• Calculate risk-adjusted expected values E[I(i) φ(I)] by taking “weighted averages”.
• Allocate capital in proportion to risk, by:5
q(i) k(i)
k
=
E[I(i) φ(I)] + E[I(i)](1− E[φ(I)])
E[I φ(I)] + E[I](1− E[φ(I)]) .
Of course, the RMK algorithm only presents the general framework. The crux lies in the
determination of the riskiness leverage φ. Various examples are presented in Kreps (2005), some
of which result in familiar allocation principles that can be alternatively derived by the gradient
principles.
More generally, Venter (2004) and Venter et al. (2006) introduce so-called co-measures. Specif-
ically, consider the risk measure:6
ρ(I) = E
[∑
j
hj(I)φj(I)
∣∣Condition on I] ,
5We adjust Ruhm’s formula here to be in line with the allocation above.
6The definition in Venter (2010) allows for different conditions for the different j.
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where the h are linear functions. They then define the co-measure as:
r(I(i)) = E
[
J∑
j=1
hj(I
(i))φj(I)
∣∣Condition on I] ,
which satisfies
∑n
i=1 r(I
(i)) = ρ(I) and thus serves as an allocation.
As Venter (2010) points out, even for one risk measure there may be different co-measures,
i.e. the representation is not unique. Some of them yield representations that are equivalent to
the gradient allocation, but this is not necessarily the case. In Table 1.1, the last column lists the
riskiness leverage / co-measures of some common allocation methods. We introduce two allocation
approaches by directly relying on their implementation via the RMK algorithm and co-measures.
Myers-Read Approach
Myers and Read (2001) argue that, given complete markets, default risk can be measured by the
default value, i.e. the premium the insurer would have to pay for guaranteeing its losses in the
case of a default. They then propose that “sensible” regulation will require companies to maintain
the same default value per dollar of liabilities and effectively choose this latter ratio as their risk
measure.
More precisely, following Mildenhall (2004), the default value can be written as:7
D(q(1), q(2), . . . , q(N))
= E
[
1{I≥a}(I − a)
]
= E
[
1{I≥E[I]+k(1) q(1)+...+k(N) q(N)}
(
I − [E[I] + k(1) q(1) + . . .+ k(N) q(1)])] ,
and the company’s default-to-liability ratio is:
c =
D
E[I]
=
E[1{I≥a}(I − a)]
E[I]
.
Myers and Read (2001) verify the “adding up” property for D—which again shows a relationship
7In contrast to Myers and Read (2001), we ignore the asset side and possible adjustments in calculating the “option value”.
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to the Euler principle. They continue to demonstrate that in order for the default value to remain
the same as an exposure is expanded, it is necessary that:
c =
∂D
∂q(i)
E[L(i)]
,
which in turn yields:
cE[L(i)] = E
[(
L(i) − (E[L(i)] + k(i))) 1{I≥a}]
⇒ k(i) = E [(L(i) − E[L(i)]) ∣∣I ≥ a]− c E[L(i)]
P(I ≥ a) .
This is similar to the allocation found by Venter et al. (2006), although they allocate assets
rather than capital so E[L(i)] does not occur in the first term. As indicated in their paper, it is
possible to represent this allocation as a co-measure using J = 2, h1(I) = I − E[I], φ1(I) =
1{I≥a}, h2(I) = I, and φ2(I) = − cPr[I≥a] .
D’Arcy (2011) Allocation
D’Arcy (2011) considers allocations by the RMK algorithm but identifies the flexibility in choosing
the riskiness leverage as its “greatest flaw.” To uniquely identify the “right” function, he proposes to
use capital market concepts, particularly cost-of-capital to “reflect the actual cost of recapitalizing
the firm.” Specifically, he allows the riskiness leverage to depend both on the size of the loss
realization as well as on the type of shock leading to the loss (idiosyncratic, industry-wide, or
systemic). The riskiness leverage factor is the ratio of the cost of capital divided by the normal cost
of capital, where the “realized” cost of capital, in addition to systemic factors, depends additively
on the ratio of aggregate losses to the firm’s actual capital:
φ(I) =
1{I≥C}(CoCmarket + I−aa )
CoCnormal
. (1.7)
It is important to note that D’Arcy (2011) only proposes the RMK algorithm for the “consumptive”
aspect of capital allocation, whereas he also includes a “non-consumptive” allocation in the spirit
of Mango (2005) (see Section 1.3.4).
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1.3.4 Consumptive vs. Non-consumptive Capital
Mango (2005) argues that capital costs consist of two parts: On the one hand, an insurer’s capital
stock can be depleted if a loss realization exceeds the reserves for a certain segment or line, or
when reserves are increased. He refers to this as a consumptive use of capital since in this case,
funds are transferred from the (shared) capital account to the (segment-specific) reserve account.
The second, non-consumptive component arises from a “capacity occupation cost” that compen-
sates the firm for preclusion of other opportunities. It is thought to originate from rating agency
requirements in the sense that taking on a certain liability depletes the underwriting capacity.
The importance of this distinction for our purposes is that it complicates practice in cases where
the two sources of costs require different approaches to allocation. For example, D’Arcy (2011)
follows Mango’s suggestion by first allocating consumptive capital via the RMK algorithm, where
the riskiness leverage or capital call cost factor φ is associated with the cost of capital (see also
Bear (2006) and D’Arcy (2011)). He then allocates capital according to regulatory rules, and the
final allocation ends up as an average of the two allocations. Thus, the two different motivations
for holding capital are reflected in a hybridization of allocation methods.
1.3.5 Capital Allocation by Percentile Layer
Bodoff (2009) argues that allocations according to Value at Risk or according to tail risk measures
do not consider loss realizations at smaller percentiles, even though the firm’s capital obviously
supports these loss levels as well. Thus, in order to allocate, he advocates considering all loss
layers up to the considered confidence level. His approach considers allocating capital to loss
events, but since we are interested in allocating capital to lines we follow the description from
Venter (2010).
Assume the capital k is determined by some given risk measure. For instance, VaR is used in
Bodoff (2009). Then the allocation for the layer of capital [z, z + dz] is:
E
[
I(i)
I
∣∣I ≥ z]× dz.
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Going over all layers of capital, we obtain the allocation:
q(i) k(i) =
∫ k
0
E
[
I(i)
I
∣∣I ≥ z] dz,
where obviously:
N∑
i=1
q(i) k(i) =
∫ k
0
E
[
I
I
∣∣I ≥ z] dz = ∫ k
0
dz = k.
As Venter (2010) points out, even if k is set equal to a risk measure and allowed to change with the
volume of the writings, the resulting allocation does not collapse to the gradient allocation in any
known cases.
When implementing the approach based on a sample of size N , obviously it is necessary to
approximate the integral formulation above. When we base it on VaRα and use the simple empirical
quantile for its estimation, we can set:
q(i) k(i) =
αN∑
j=1
E
[
I(i)
I
∣∣I ≥ I(j)] [I(j) − I(j−1)] ,
where we set I(0) = 0. Since the conditional expectations within the sum have to be also ap-
proximated by taking averages, the implementation in a spreadsheet may be cumbersome (or even
infeasible) for large samples.
1.3.6 “Economic” Counterparty Allocation
The previous Sections 1.3.1 to 1.3.5 outline so-called “conventional” capital allocation methods.
While all conventional methods vary in techniques, they consider capital allocation as a technical
problem but do not contemplate the motivation for holding capital in the first place. In contrast,
Bauer and Zanjani (2016) argue that the demand side’s risk preferences would have an impact
on the optimal capital and allocation decision. More precisely, Bauer and Zanjani introduce a
theoretical framework of capital allocation that is derived from the insurer’s profit maximization
subject to counterparty risk aversion. The concept is fundamentally different from problem (1.4),
where the premium and risk measure are exogenously determined. Here, the premium is a choice
variable for the insurer, subject to a participation constraint for the counterparty. In particular,
16
there is no risk measure to be imposed in the first place, but an endogenous expression for the risk
measure can be derived from the allocation rule. In the remainder of the essay, we will refer to this
allocation as Bauer-Zanjani allocation.
To elaborate on the setup, it is assumed that we have a group of N consumers/policyholders.
Each consumer has wealth wi and is susceptible to a loss Li, which is random. Each consumer
is risk averse by default, and has utility function Ui and expected utility vi. Each consumer can
purchase insurance to recover a portion qi ∈ [0, 1] of the loss at premium rate pi. Both pi and
qi are chosen by the insurer. The insurer will collect the premium upfront and deliver a total of
I =
∑
qiLi for indemnity payments. The expected payback to each consumer is ei = E[Ri] =
min(qiLi, qiLia/I), with the latter amount triggered by insurer’s default, or when its asset a are
less than total indemnity payment I . The insurer then solves the following one-period optimization
problem:
max
a,{qi},{pi}
N∑
i=1
pi −
N∑
i=1
ei − τa (1.8)
subject to participation constraints for each consumer:
vi = E[Ui(wi − pi − Li +Ri)] ≥ E[Ui(wi − Li)] ∀i.
The solution suggests that an allocation weight for each consumer/policyholder is:
ki
k
=
E
[
1{I≥a}
∑
k
U ′k
v′k
Ik
I2
∂Ii
∂qi
]
E
[
1{I≥a}
∑
k
U ′k
v′k
Ik
I
] . (1.9)
The supporting risk measure takes the form:
ρ(I) = exp
{
EP˜ [log(I)]
}
,
where the measure P˜ is given by its likelihood ratio:
∂P˜
∂P
=
1{I≥a}
∑
k
U ′k
v′k
Ik
I
E
[
1{I≥a}
∑
k
U ′k
v′k
Ik
I
] .
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It turns out that this risk measure does not satisfy the common axioms of coherence and con-
vexity. It is important to note that within this framework, the allocation results are determined
through optimization. In particular, the exposure parameters qi are not fixed but determined in the
optimization procedure – unlike in the “conventional” approaches.
1.3.7 Some Connections between the Allocations
Table 1.1 presents implementation of all allocation methods mentioned in the previous sections.
As a side note, there are several connections between the various allocation methods beyond what
has been pointed out so far in this section. We list them here:
• For elliptical distributions, the Euler allocation yields to the same relative amounts of capital
allocated to each line, irrespective of which (homogeneous) risk measure we use (McNeil
et al., 2015, Corollary 6.27).
• Asimit et al. (2012) show that risk capital allocation based on TVaR is asymptotically pro-
portional to the corresponding Value-at-Risk (VaR) risk measure as the confidence level goes
to 1.
Moreover, Figure 1.1 illustrates graphically the relationship between various methods discussed
in this section. In the next three sections, we compare the methods based on two example settings.
1.4 Comparison of Capital Allocation Methods
Next, we analyze the allocation problems and methods discussed in the previous sections in the
context of (i) a Binomial loss model and (ii) real-world catastrophe insurance losses. Specifi-
cally for comparison (ii), we gained access to (scaled) simulated loss data for a global catastrophe
reinsurance company. We believe this data offers a degree of realism missing from previous con-
tributions where proposed allocation methods are only studied in the context of stylized examples
or based on Normal distributions (which is particularly limiting as discussed in Section 1.3.7).
We start by outlining the allocation approaches in Section 1.4.1. In the following two Sections
1.5 and 1.6, we present the implementation in the two settings. In Section 1.6, we also present a
18
Allocation Risk Measure/ Capital to Hold ρ(I) Allocation to Line i: ∂ρ(I)/∂q(i) RMK Riskiness Leverage / Co-Measures
CoVar E[I] + βStDev[I] E[I(i)] + β
Cov(I(i), I)√
Var[I]
φ(I) = β
I − E[I]
StDev(I)
VaR VaRα(I) = inf{x : FI(x) ≥ α} E
[
L(i)
∣∣I = VaRα(I)] φ(I) = dirac.δ(I − VaRα(I))
fI(VaRα(I))
TVaR TVaRα(I) = E
[
I
∣∣I ≥ VaRα(I)] E [L(i)∣∣I ≥ VaRα(I)] φ(I) = 1{I≥VaRα(I)}
1− α
RTVaR E
[
I
∣∣I ≥ VaRα(I)] E [L(i)|I ≥ VaRα(I)] h1(x) = h2(x) = x, φ1 ≡ 1,
+βStDev[I|I ≥ VaRα(I)] +β Cov (Ii, I|I ≥ VaRα(I))
StDev (I|I ≥ VaRα(I))
φ2 = β
I − E[I]
StDev(I|I ≥ VaRα(I))
Exponential E
[
I exp
{
c I
E[I]
}]
E
[
L(i) exp
{
c I
E[I]
}]
+ c
E[L(j)]
E[I]
h1(I) = I, φ1(I) = e
cI
E[I] + c
Ie
cI
E[I]
E[I]
×E
[
I exp
{
c I
E[I]
}
×
(
L(i)
E[L(i)]
− I
E[I]
)]
h2(I) = −E[I], φ2(I) = c I
2 e
cI
E[I]
E[I2]
Distortion E [I g′(SI (I))] E
[
L(i) g′(SI (I))
]
—
∗Proportional Hazard g(p) = pa
* Wang Transformation
g(p) = 1− Φ (Φ−1(1− p)− λ)
Myers-Read E[1{I≥a}(I − a)] E
[(
L(i) − E[L(i)]) ∣∣I ≥ a] h1(I) = I − E[I], φ1(I) = 1{I≥a},
−E[1{I≥a}(I − a)]
E[I]
E[L(i)]
P(I ≥ a) h2(I) = I, φ2(I) = −
c
Pr[I ≥ a] .
Esscher
E
[
Iet I
]
E [et I ]
E
[
L(i)et I
]
E [et I ]
—
Kamps
E
[
I(1− e−t I)]
E [(1− e−t I)]
E
[
L(i)(1− e−t I)]
E [(1− e−t I)] —
D’Arcy — — φ(I) =
1{I≥C}(CoCmarket +
I − a
a
)
CoCnormal
Bodoff VaRα(I)
∑αN
j=1 E
[
L(i)
I
∣∣I ≥ I(j)
] [
I(j) − I(j−1)
]
—
Bauer-Zanjani exp
{
EP˜ [log(I)]
}
ρ(I) · EP˜
[
Ii
I
]
—
Table 1.1: Implementation of allocation methods
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Figure 1.1: Overview of capital allocation methods
sensitivity analysis to examine the stability of allocations.
1.4.1 Allocation Approaches
For allocation techniques in both examples, we consider the following approaches:
• Allocation by expected values.
• A covariance allocation. Here we choose the parameter β = 2 due to the similarities of the
supporting risk measure to a quantile for a Normal distribution, where 2 (or rather 1.96 for a
two-sided confidence interval of 95%) is a common choice.
• TVaR (Expected Shortfall) allocations for confidence levels α = 75%, 90%, 95%, and 99%.
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• VaR based allocations for confidence levels α = 95% and 99%. In example (ii), in addition
to estimating the allocations based on splitting up the corresponding empirical quantile in its
loss components (labeled “simple”), we consider an estimation that takes into account the
surrounding realizations by imposing a bell curve centered at the quantile with a standard
deviation of three (labeled “bell”).
• Exponential allocations for parameters c = 0.1, 0.25, and 1.
• Allocations based on a distortion risk measure–in particular proportional hazard transform
and Wang transform. For the proportional hazard transform parameters, we use a = 0.6,
a = 0.8, and a = 0.95, where we follow Wang (1998) indicating that a typical transform
parameter ranges from 0.5 to 1, depending on the ambiguity regarding the best-estimate
loss distribution. For the Wang transform parameters, we use λ = 0.25, λ = 0.5, and
λ = 0.75, where we follow Wang (2012) indicating that a typical transform parameters in
the reinsurance domain range between 0.5 and 0.77, whereas 0.25 is a typical assumption for
long-termed Sharpe ratios in the financial market.
• Myers-Read allocations for different capital levels (Section 1.3.3). In particular, we choose
the capital equal to the 99.94% quantile, which roughly depends on capital levels to support
an AM Best AA+ rating; three times the premium which is roughly consistent with NAIC
aggregate levels; and the 99% VaR just for comparison purposes.
• Weighted/transform-based allocations based on the Esscher and Kamps transform. Here we
choose transform parameters such that an evaluation is possible (non-explosive) but suffi-
ciently different from the expected value allocation (which results for t = 0).
• The D’Arcy (2011) implementation of the RMK algorithm (Section 1.3.3), where we rely
two on the same (first) two capital levels as for the Myers-Read allocation.
• Allocations based on the percentile layer (Bodoff in Section 1.3.5), where we allocate the
90%, 95%, and 99% VaR.
• RTVaR allocations with α = 75%, 90%, and 95% and β = 2 as for the covariance allocation.
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• Allocation on the (simple) average of the four considered TVaRs.
• Bauer-Zanjani allocations. Since their approach relies on the solution of an optimization
problem, we need to specify the necessary ingredients. We provide details on the solution
within both settings in Appendix Section 1.8.
1.5 The Case of Heterogeneous Bernoulli Losses
We consider individuals that face Bernoulli-distributed losses belonging to three groups. More
precisely, we assume:
• m = 3 groups of identical consumers, with N1 = N2 = N3 = 5, with the same probability
of loss pi1 = pi2 = pi3 = 0.1;
• The size of the losses differ among groups, with l1 = 1, l2 = 2, and l3 = 3;
For conventional allocation, we consider allocation of capital three groups of consumer and
assume full exposure in all groups. Therefore, the total loss indemnity in each group is Ii = kili,
where ki ∼ Binomial(Ni, pii) and the total indemnity of the company is I = k1l1 +k2l2 +k3l3. The
computation of expectation, standard deviation, VaR, TVaR, and other moments of I are trivial and
those statistics are used to calculate allocation weights. The results are listed in Table 1.2.
For Bauer-Zanjani allocation, we assume that all groups have the same CARA preferences and
absolute risk aversion parameters α1 = α2 = α3 = α and solve the allocation problem using
α from 0.1 to 2. It is well known that with CARA preferences, initial wealth is irrelevant. We
impose a frictional cost of τ = 0.01. We optimize objective function (1.8), obtain the parameters,
and use equation (1.10) in Appendix 1.8.1 to obtain the allocation weights. The optimization and
allocation results are shown in Table 1.3.
Figure 1.2 provides a direct comparison of the different allocation methods (except for Exp
c=1). More precisely, since we have three different groups and allocation percentages ki/k add up
to one, we can depict allocations by two numbers. We choose allocation percentages to groups 1
and 3, where of course the allocation to Group 2 can be calculated as the difference of their sum
and one.
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Surprisingly, all methods lies along a line that shows a trade off between allocating more to
Group 3, which has the biggest loss size, and allocating more to Group 1, which has the smallest
loss size. We observe that the tail-focused allocations such as Myers-Read lie on one extreme end
and allocates the most to Group 3, while expected value allocation lies on the other extreme end
and allocates the least to Group 3. Methods with distortion risk measures and weighted distribution
transformation result in allocations closer to expected value method. VaR, TVaR and Risk-adjusted
TVaR methods are in between, with RTVaR (more tailed focused) allocating more to Group 3,
followed by TVaR and VaR.
The Bauer-Zanjani allocations also adhere to the same relationship, where a higher risk aversion
parameter α pushes towards the tail risk measures – e.g. BZ-2.0 (the Bauer-Zanjani allocation
with α = 2) resembles the TVaR 95% allocation (seen in Figure 1.2(a)). For smaller risk aversion,
the allocation is closer to the allocations focusing on the whole distribution – e.g. BZ-0.1 (the
Bauer-Zanjani allocation with α = 0.1) resembles the Bodoff, Wang transformation with large λ,
proportional hazard with small a, and the Kamps allocations (seen in Figure 1.2(b)).
Overall, we find that despite the variety in capital allocation methods proposed, it appears that
they produce rather similar results with differences being explained by a single parameter that
roughly corresponds to how much tail scenarios are emphasized.
1.6 The Case of Catastrophe Reinsurance Losses
For this application, we begin by describing in detail the data and the approach to aggregation in
Section 1.6.1. In particular, for our analyses, we limit the presentation to an aggregation to four
lines only in order to facilitate interpretation of the results. Here we follow Bauer and Zanjani
(2018) where the same data and aggregations are used. We then compare allocation methods in
Section 1.6.2. Finally, we consider their stability in Section 1.6.3.
1.6.1 Description of the Data
We are given 50,000 joint loss realizations for 24 distinct lines differing by peril and geographical
region. Figure 1.3 provides a histogram of the aggregate loss distribution, and Table 1.4 lists the
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Allocation Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Sum RiskMeas
Exp Val 0.5000 1.0000 1.5000 3.0000 3.0000
16.67% 33.33% 50.00% 100.00%
CovWBeta 0.8586 2.4343 4.7271 8.0200 8.0200
beta = 2 10.71% 30.35% 58.94% 100.00%
VaR 95% 0.6611 2.4447 4.8942 8.0000 8.0000
8.26% 30.56% 61.18% 100.00%
VaR 99% 0.8780 2.9425 6.1795 10.0000 10.0000
8.78% 29.42% 61.80% 100.00%
TVaR 75% 0.6656 2.0093 3.7754 6.4502 6.4502
10.32% 31.15% 58.53% 100.00%
TVaR 90% 0.7582 2.0146 4.5103 7.2832 7.2832
10.41% 27.66% 61.93% 100.00%
TVaR 95% 0.7810 2.5699 5.6869 9.0378 9.0378
8.64% 28.44% 62.92% 100.00%
TVaR 99% 0.8953 3.0652 6.9330 10.8935 10.8935
8.22% 28.14% 63.64% 100.00%
Exponential 0.5445 1.1633 1.8607 3.5684 3.5684
c = 0.1 15.26% 32.60% 52.14% 100.00%
Exponential 0.6026 1.4657 2.6257 4.6939 4.6939
c = 0.25 12.84% 31.22% 55.94% 100.00%
Exponential -1.6958 4.5706 22.1425 25.0172 25.0172
c = 1 -6.78% 18.27% 88.51% 100.00%
Proportional Hazard 0.6464 1.5479 2.8057 5.0000 5.0000
a = 0.6 12.93% 30.96% 56.11% 100.00%
Proportional Hazard 0.5599 1.2152 1.9970 3.7722 3.7722
a = 0.8 14.84% 32.22% 52.94% 100.00%
Proportional Hazard 0.5133 1.0467 1.6054 3.1653 3.1653
a = 0.95 16.22% 33.07% 50.72% 100.00%
Wang Trans. 0.5713 1.2297 1.9857 3.7868 3.7868
λ = 0.25 15.09% 32.47% 52.44% 100.00%
Wang Trans. 0.6428 1.4808 2.5548 4.6784 4.6784
λ = 0.5 13.74% 31.65% 54.61% 100.00%
Wang Trans. 0.7148 1.7523 3.2058 5.6729 5.6729
λ = 0.75 12.60% 30.89% 56.51% 100.00%
Myers-Read 0.2463 1.7674 4.9863 7.0000 7.0000
a = 10 3.52% 25.25% 71.23% 100.00%
Myers-Read 0.1080 1.2239 3.6681 5.0000 5.0000
a = 8 2.16% 24.48% 73.36% 100.00%
Esscher 0.5468 1.1949 1.9563 3.6981 3.6981
t = 0.1 14.79% 32.31% 52.90% 100.00%
Kamps 0.6391 1.5347 2.6560 4.8299 4.8299
t = 0.1 13.23% 31.78% 54.99% 100.00%
Esscher 0.5045 1.0181 1.5410 3.0637 3.0637
t = 0.01 16.47% 33.23% 50.30% 100.00%
Kamps 0.6487 1.5926 2.8280 5.0694 5.0694
t = 0.01 12.80% 31.42% 55.79% 100.00%
Esscher 0.5005 1.0018 1.5041 3.0063 3.0063
t = 0.001 16.65% 33.32% 50.03% 100.00%
Kamps 0.6499 1.5993 2.8478 5.0969 5.0969
t = 0.001 12.75% 31.38% 55.87% 100.00%
D’Arcy 0.5073 1.0380 1.6067 3.1519 3.1519
a = 10 16.09% 32.93% 50.98% 100.00%
D’Arcy 0.5312 1.1442 1.9093 3.5847 3.5847
a = 8 14.82% 31.92% 53.26% 100.00%
Bodoff 90% 0.9016 1.9442 3.1542 6.0000 6.0000
15.03% 32.40% 52.57% 100.00%
Bodoff 95% 1.0894 2.5262 4.3844 8.0000 8.0000
13.62% 31.58% 54.80% 100.00%
Bodoff 99% 1.2622 3.0769 5.6610 10.0000 10.0000
12.62% 30.77% 56.61% 100.00%
RTVaR 95% 0.9740 3.1442 7.6200 11.7382 11.7382
8.30% 26.79% 64.92% 100.00%
RTVaR 99% 0.9909 3.5364 8.7626 13.2899 13.2899
7.46% 26.61% 65.93% 100.00%
Table 1.2: Conventional allocation results–heterogeneous Bernoulli case
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(a) (b)
Figure 1.2: Comparison of allocations–heterogeneous Bernoulli losses
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Optimization Results Allocation Results
α a p1 p2 p3 q1 q2 q3 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
0.1 5.2608 0.0913 0.1961 0.3023 0.9232 0.9747 1.0000 12.73% 31.03% 56.25%
0.2 6.3701 0.1023 0.2270 0.3719 0.9584 0.9846 1.0000 11.89% 31.82% 56.29%
0.3 6.9498 0.1085 0.2542 0.4375 0.9589 0.9889 1.0000 10.17% 31.13% 58.70%
0.4 7.4627 0.1162 0.2820 0.5087 0.9773 0.9912 1.0000 10.53% 30.72% 58.75%
0.5 7.7758 0.1226 0.3114 0.5868 0.9810 0.9927 1.0000 10.53% 30.65% 58.82%
0.6 8.0124 0.1290 0.3429 0.6720 0.9835 0.9936 1.0000 10.59% 29.23% 60.18%
0.7 8.2992 0.1356 0.3766 0.7639 0.9855 0.9943 1.0000 10.58% 29.21% 60.22%
0.8 8.5196 0.1425 0.4126 0.8607 0.9871 0.9948 1.0000 10.57% 29.19% 60.24%
0.9 8.6959 0.1495 0.4507 0.9606 0.9884 0.9952 1.0000 10.56% 29.17% 60.27%
1.0 8.8415 0.1569 0.4909 1.0617 0.9894 0.9955 1.0000 10.55% 29.16% 60.29%
1.1 8.9645 0.1646 0.5327 1.1617 0.9903 0.9957 1.0000 9.71% 28.19% 62.10%
1.2 9.1344 0.1725 0.5759 1.2592 0.9909 0.9960 1.0000 9.68% 30.09% 60.23%
1.3 9.2885 0.1807 0.6200 1.3527 0.9915 0.9962 1.0000 9.67% 30.06% 60.27%
1.4 9.4235 0.1892 0.6647 1.4412 0.9920 0.9964 1.0000 9.66% 30.04% 60.30%
1.5 9.5434 0.1980 0.7096 1.5242 0.9924 0.9965 1.0000 9.66% 30.01% 60.33%
1.6 9.6511 0.2071 0.7541 1.6015 0.9928 0.9967 1.0000 9.65% 29.99% 60.35%
1.7 9.7489 0.2165 0.7981 1.6731 0.9931 0.9968 1.0000 9.65% 29.97% 60.38%
1.8 9.8384 0.2261 0.8411 1.7392 0.9934 0.9969 1.0000 9.64% 29.96% 60.40%
1.9 9.9211 0.2360 0.8829 1.8001 0.9937 0.9970 1.0000 9.64% 29.94% 60.42%
2.0 10.0048 0.2461 0.9233 1.8563 0.9939 0.9971 1.0000 9.06% 28.94% 62.00%
Table 1.3: Optimization and allocation results: Bauer-Zanjani allocation heterogeneous Bernoulli losses
lines and provides some descriptive statistics about each line. The largest lines for our reinsurer
(by premiums and expected losses) are “US Hurricane,” “N American EQ West” (North American
Earthquake West), and “ExTropical Cyclone” (Extratropical Cyclone). The expected aggregate
loss is $187,819,998 with a standard deviation of $162,901,154, and the aggregate premium in-
come is $346,137,808.
We consider an aggregation to four lines, with line numbers listed in Column “Agg.” Here,
where we lump together all lines by perils. In particular, we can think of Line 1 as “earthquake,”
Line 2 as “storm and flood,” Line 3 as “fire & crop,” and Line 4 as “terror & casualty.” In order to
keep the results comprehensible, we limit the exposition to this four-line aggregation level. Figure
1.4 shows histograms for each of these four lines.
We notice that the “earthquake” distribution is concentrated at low loss levels with only rela-
tively few realizations exceeding $50,000,000 (the 99% VaR only slightly exceeds $300,000,000).
However, the distribution depicts relatively fat tails with a maximum loss realization of only
slightly under one billion. The (aggregated) premium for this line is $46,336,664 with an expected
loss of $23,345,695.
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Line Premiums Expected Loss Standard Deviation Agg
N American EQ East 6,824,790.67 4,175,221.76 26,321,685.65 1
N American EQ West 31,222,440.54 13,927,357.33 47,198,747.52 1
S American EQ 471,810.50 215,642.22 915,540.16 1
Australia EQ 1,861,157.54 1,712,765.11 13,637,692.79 1
Europe EQ 2,198,888.30 1,729,224.02 5,947,164.14 1
Israel EQ 642,476.65 270,557.81 3,234,795.57 1
NZ EQ 2,901,010.54 1,111,430.78 9,860,005.28 1
Turkey EQ 214,089.04 203,495.77 1,505,019.84 1
N Amer. Severe Storm 16,988,195.98 13,879,861.84 15,742,997.51 2
US Hurricane 186,124,742.31 94,652,100.36 131,791,737.41 2
US Winterstorm 2,144,034.55 1,967,700.56 2,611,669.54 2
Australia Storm 124,632.81 88,108.80 622,194.10 2
Europe Flood 536,507.77 598,660.08 2,092,739.85 2
ExTropical Cyclone 37,033,667.38 23,602,490.43 65,121,405.35 2
UK Flood 377,922.95 252,833.64 2,221,965.76 2
US Brushfire 12,526,132.95 8,772,497.86 24,016,196.20 3
Australian Terror 2,945,767.58 1,729,874.98 11,829,262.37 4
CBNR Only 1,995,606.55 891,617.77 2,453,327.70 4
Cert. Terrorism xCBNR 3,961,059.67 2,099,602.62 2,975,452.18 4
Domestic Macro TR 648,938.81 374,808.73 1,316,650.55 4
Europe Terror 4,512,221.99 2,431,694.65 8,859,402.41 4
Non Certified Terror 2,669,239.84 624,652.88 1,138,937.44 4
Casualty 5,745,278.75 2,622,161.64 1,651,774.25 4
N American Crop 21,467,194.16 9,885,636.27 18,869,901.33 3
Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics
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Figure 1.3: Histograms for aggregate loss
“Storm & flood” is by far the largest line, both in terms of premiums ($243,329,704) and
expected losses ($135,041,756). The distribution is concentrated around loss realizations between
25 and 500 million, though the maximum loss in our 50,000 realizations is almost four times that
size. The 99% VaR is approximately 700 million USD.
In comparison, the “fire & crop” and “terror & casualty” lines are small with an (aggregated)
premiums (expected loss) of about 34 (19) million and 22.5 (11) million, respectively. The max-
imal realizations are around 500 million for “fire & crop” (99% VaR = 163,922,557) and around
190 million for “terror & casualty” (99% VaR = 103,308,358).
We consider the same allocation approaches outlined in Section 1.4.1. For the Bauer-Zanjani
allocations, we again consider CARA preferences with different absolute risk aversion levels. The
results of the optimization procedure are provided in Table 1.6. For details on the implementation
procedure, we refer to Appendix 1.8.2.
1.6.2 Comparisons for the Unmodified Portfolio
Table 1.5 presents conventional allocation results for the (unmodified) portfolio of the company.
Here for each allocation method, we list the capital levels for each line, their sum, as well as the
risk measure evaluated for the aggregate loss distributions. Obviously, the last two numbers should
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(a) Line 1: earthquake (b) Line 2: storm & flood
(c) Line 3: fire & crop (d) Line 4: terror & casualty
Figure 1.4: Histograms for four aggregated lines
coincide—which can serve as a simple check for the calculations.
These aggregate risk measures vary tremendously, and thus so do the by-line allocations. For
instance, it is trivial that the 99% quantile (VaR) is far greater than the 95% quantile (VaR). Thus,
in the second line for each method, Table 1.5 again lists the allocations as a percentage of the
aggregate risk measure. These are the percentages on which we will base our comparisons. This is
not only because it facilitates comparisons, but also because this is in line with practice where the
actual capital of a company may not be given in terms of a risk measure at all, or even if it is this
may not be the measure used for allocation.
The first observation when comparing the allocations is the realizations that many of them look
quite similar, which resonates with observations in other studies. For instance, in the context of
assumptions used for the CAS DFA modeling challenge (“Bohra-Weist DFAIC distributions”),
29
Vaughn (2007) points out that a variety of methods, including allocations based on “covariance,
Myers/Read, RMK with Variance, Mango Capital Consumption, and XTVaR99 are all remarkably
similar.” We find similar results in the context of an example from life insurance (Bauer and Zan-
jani, 2013). There are a few outliers, however, most notably the Exponential Allocation with c = 1.
The reason is that here there is an extreme weight on the extreme tail—that in turn is driven by
very extreme realizations of line 2. Indeed there are various realizations in the aggregate tail where
the line realizations for lines 1, 3, and 4 are under the expected loss, which explains the resulting
negative allocations to these lines.
For comparing the remaining allocations, in analogy to the comparison in Section 1.5, we note
that each allocation in our four-line context is characterized by three—not four—real numbers,
since the fourth follows by subtracting the sum of the others from 100%. Hence, similarly to
Figure 1.2 we can compare allocations as points in a three-dimensional space, and moreover we
can evaluate the “distance” between two allocations by identifying it with the distance between the
two points in terms of its Euclidean norm.
Figure 1.5(a) plots all of our allocations except for the aforementioned exponential allocation
with c = 1. From Panel 1.5(a), we see that there are a few other outliers in the sense that the dis-
tance to other allocation methods is quite significant: Three value at risk allocations, namely the
“simple” calculation (VaR1S, VaR2S) for both confidence levels and the bell-curve based calcula-
tion for the higher confidence level (VaR2B); and the Esscher allocation for the (high) parameter
of 1E-7 (Essch1). The intuition for the latter is, again, the exponential weight pushing all rele-
vance to the extreme tail where line 2 dominates the others. Hence, both the exponential allocation
and the Esscher allocations are extremely sensitive to the choice of the parameter (although this
sensitivity does not appear to apply to the Kamps allocation). For VaR, on the other hand, it is
well-known that estimation based on Monte Carlo simulation is erratic (Kalkbrener, 2005)—so it
may be numerical errors driving these outliers (at least for VaR1S).
Interestingly, aside from the “outlier” allocations mentioned above and two Myers-Read al-
locations, the points all appear to lie on a parabola-shaped curve in three-dimensional space that
is suggestive of a systematic pattern. Hence, similarly to the findings in Section 1.5, the differ-
ences among allocation seems to be explained by a single parameter. In order to zoom in on the
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Allocation Line 1 Line 2 Line 3 Line 4 Sum RiskMeas
Exp Val 23,345,695 135,041,756 18,658,134 10,774,413 187,819,998 187,819,998
12.43% 71.90% 9.93% 5.74% 100%
CovWBeta 62,292,648 398,599,625 38,938,608 13,791,425 513,622,306 513,622,306
β = 2 12.13% 77.61% 7.58% 2.69% 100%
TVaR75% 51,212,126 301,490,365 34,960,054 13,571,979 401,234,524 401,234,524
12.76% 75.14% 8.71% 3.38% 100%
TVaR90% 72,975,560 462,489,152 42,432,578 12,350,749 590,248,038 590,248,038
12.36% 78.36% 7.19% 2.09% 100%
TVaR95% 85,607,782 596,451,028 44,523,108 11,979,729 738,561,647 738,561,647
11.59% 80.76% 6.03% 1.62% 100%
TVaR99% 106,293,324 869,605,928 58,168,596 11,294,985 1,045,362,832 1,045,362,832
10.17% 83.19% 5.56% 1.08% 100%
VaR95% (simple) 9,776,274 330,811,906 173,984,700 14,118,944 528,691,824 528,691,824
1.85% 62.57% 32.91% 2.67% 100%
VaR95% (bell) 62,367,597 404,259,189 51,869,109 10,157,414 528,653,309 528,653,309
11.80% 76.47% 9.81% 1.92% 100%
VaR99% (simple) 7,170,815 816,870,497 39,256,266 4,060,778 867,358,356 867,358,356
0.83% 94.18% 4.53% 0.47% 100%
VaR99% (bell) 40,819,623 780,226,792 29,835,131 16,807,649 867,689,194 867,689,194
4.70% 89.92% 3.44% 1.94% 100%
Exponential 27,850,426 166,607,986 20,890,454 10,989,763 226,338,629 226,338,629
c = 0.1 12.30% 73.61% 9.23% 4.86% 100%
Exponential 37,216,272 245,941,709 23,451,637 8,755,958 315,365,576 315,365,576
c = 0.25 11.80% 77.99% 7.44% 2.78% 100%
Exponential -3,671,904,055 23,720,252,516 -4,880,193,171 -3,252,109,822 11,916,045,468 11,916,045,468
c = 1 -30.81% 199.06% -40.95% -27.29% 100%
Proportional Hazard 36,080,499 226,703,991 25,110,583 11,640,570 299,535,643 299,535,643
a = 0.6 12.05% 75.69% 8.38% 3.89% 100%
Proportional Hazard 28,192,014 168,301,360 21,223,234 11,199,323 228,915,932 228,915,932
a = 0.8 12.32% 73.52% 9.27% 4.89% 100%
Proportional Hazard 24,363,235 141,822,074 19,212,540 10,880,196 196,278,045 196,278,045
a = 0.95 12.41% 72.26% 9.79% 5.54% 100%
Wang 27,893,622 164,362,273 21,313,685 11,452,085 225,021,665 225,021,665
λ = 0.25 12.40% 73.04% 9.47% 5.09% 100%
Wang 33,402,026 201,407,441 24,294,793 12,004,713 271,108,972 271,108,972
λ = 0.5 12.32% 74.29% 8.96% 4.43% 100%
Wang 39,867,730 247,043,116 27,573,810 12,410,105 326,894,761 326,894,761
λ = 0.75 12.20% 75.57% 8.44% 3.80% 100%
MyersRead, 120,879,204 1,006,221,885 50,599,598 -7,876,720 1,169,823,967 1,169,823,967
a =1,357,643,965 10.33% 86.01% 4.33% -0.67% 100%
MyersRead, 64,285,407 756,847,100 37,746,242 -8,285,324 850,593,426 850,593,426
a =1,038,413,423 7.56% 88.98% 4.44% -0.97% 100%
MyersRead, 60,821,986 606,579,733 21,827,406 -9,690,768 679,538,358 679,538,358
a =867,358,356 8.95% 89.26% 3.21% -1.43% 100%
Esscher, t = 8,226,240 1,987,777,539 54,262,714 72,291,051 2,122,557,544 2,122,557,544
1.E-07 0.39% 93.65% 2.56% 3.41% 100%
Esscher, t= 27,359,301 163,201,071 20,690,228 11,031,052 222,281,653 222,281,653
1.E-09 12.31% 73.42% 9.31% 4.96% 100%
Kamps, t= 26,654,710 155,020,509 20,725,105 11,406,228 213,806,553 213,806,553
1.E-08 12.47% 72.51% 9.69% 5.33% 100%
Kamps, t= 40,195,291 249,028,113 27,434,525 12,082,021 328,739,950 328,739,950
1.E-11 12.23% 75.75% 8.35% 3.68% 100%
D’Arcy, a = 55,387,701 408,352,811 25,296,290 5,487,442 494,524,244 494,524,244
1,357,643,965 11.20% 82.57% 5.12% 1.11% 100%
D’Arcy, a = 104,209,232 875,467,350 62,492,051 11,388,390 1,053,557,023 1,053,557,023
1,038,413,423 9.89% 83.10% 5.93% 1.08% 100%
Bodoff, 47,772,088 273,086,001 36,572,490 18,591,385 376,021,964 376,021,964
VaR90% 12.70% 72.63% 9.73% 4.94% 100%
Bodoff, 66,892,452 393,236,293 46,970,415 21,592,664 528,691,824 528,691,824
VaR95% 12.65% 74.38% 8.88% 4.08% 100%
Bodoff, 104,581,664 670,427,703 66,183,982 26,165,006 867,358,356 867,358,356
VaR99% 12.06% 77.30% 7.63% 3.02% 100%
RTVaR 93,544,093 654,561,402 50,055,237 11,458,019 809,618,751 809,618,751
α = 75%, β = 2 11.55% 80.85% 6.18% 1.42% 100%
RTVaR 107,255,495 824,861,293 53,516,378 11,599,036 997,232,202 997,232,202
α = 90%, β = 2 10.76% 82.72% 5.37% 1.16% 100%
RTVaR 114,157,530 935,144,574 61,454,489 11,804,261 1,122,560,854 1,122,560,854
α = 95%, β = 2 10.17% 83.30% 5.47% 1.05% 100%
AvgTVaR 79,022,198 557,509,118 45,021,084 12,299,361 693,851,760 693,851,760
11.39% 80.35% 6.49% 1.77% 100%
Table 1.5: Conventional allocation results–catastrophe reinsurance case
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Optimization Results Allocation Results
α a q(1) q(2) q(3) q(4) Line 1 Line 2 Line 3 Line 4
5.00E-10 2.89E+08 0.8290 0.6538 0.5235 0.4896 16.06% 77.86% 4.70% 1.38%
7.00E-10 3.98E+08 0.9076 0.7990 0.6436 0.6268 13.70% 80.54% 4.47% 1.30%
1.00E-09 5.02E+08 0.9467 0.8863 0.7300 0.7284 11.33% 83.07% 4.38% 1.23%
2.00E-09 6.94E+08 0.9761 0.9616 0.8359 0.8457 7.72% 86.91% 4.32% 1.05%
3.00E-09 8.13E+08 0.9832 0.9799 0.8766 0.8752 5.86% 88.78% 4.35% 1.02%
4.00E-09 9.18E+08 0.9874 0.9874 0.9007 0.8758 4.32% 90.28% 4.27% 1.13%
5.00E-09 1.02E+09 0.9902 0.9913 0.9195 0.8615 3.54% 91.10% 3.99% 1.38%
6.00E-09 1.13E+09 0.9925 0.9934 0.9348 0.8431 2.93% 91.76% 3.59% 1.72%
7.00E-09 1.22E+09 0.9942 0.9949 0.9457 0.8299 2.25% 92.64% 3.08% 2.03%
8.00E-09 1.31E+09 0.9954 0.9958 0.9526 0.8237 1.66% 93.20% 2.85% 2.28%
9.00E-09 1.39E+09 0.9963 0.9965 0.9574 0.8235 1.39% 93.48% 2.67% 2.47%
1.00E-08 1.45E+09 0.9970 0.9971 0.9610 0.8272 1.15% 93.68% 2.57% 2.60%
Table 1.6: Optimization and allocation results: Bauer-Zanjani allocation catastrophe reinsurance losses
remaining allocations, Figure 1.5(b) re-plots the same points, but this time we exclude outlying
allocations as well as the two outer Myers-Read allocations. Again, the allocations seem related
and we find that the expected value allocation (EV) plays an “extreme role.” This may not come
as a surprise since suitable allocation methods should penalize risk “more than linearly” (Venter,
2010).
A number of allocation methods are very close to the expected value allocation: The Kamps
allocations, the Wang allocations, the Bodoff allocations, and the Covariance allocation are all
within 0.06 of the EV allocation. In contrast, all but one TVaR/RTVaR/AvgTVaR allocations,
the D’Arcy allocations, and the Myers-Read allocations all bunched together between 0.07 and
0.19—and all roughly along the parabola-shaped curve, where the order appears to be driven by
the parameters. The former methods are all driven by the entire distribution, whereas the focus of
the latter allocation methods is on the tails (though the Myers-Read allocation does depend on the
entire distribution).
Figure 1.5(a) shows that Bauer-Zanjani allocations (BZα) roughly lie along the parabola when
the risk aversion parameters are large, so that the allocations roughly coincide with many tail-based
allocation when the counterparty is more risk-averse. However, when the counterparty is approach-
ing risk neutrality, or when α is small, Bauer-Zanjani allocations produce results that deviate from
other allocations. A key reason for this finding lies in the underpinning optimization problem that
delivers an optimal portfolio on which the allocation is based. As is evident from Table 1.6, espe-
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cially for smaller choices of α, the portfolio weights vary in their values. In particular, the weight
for line 3, q(3), is relatively low explaining why less capital is allocated to it.
All in all, two key observations emerge. First, we observe a dissonance between tail-based allo-
cations and allocations that are based on the entire distribution. But which one is more appropriate?
Should we, or should we not, focus on tails? Venter (2010) argues that from an economic stance,
risk-taking is not risk free—any modification to risk taking should carry some charge, so that a fo-
cus on the tails is misguided. He supports using marginal (i.e., Euler-based) methods that are based
on the entire distribution such as the Wang transform, since they are most “the most commensurate
with pricing theory.” However, D’Arcy (2011) and Myers and Read (2001) also present approaches
with an economic motivations. Second, “conventional” allocations behave qualitatively different
than the “economic” Bauer-Zanjani allocations.
1.6.3 Stability of the Methods
In this section, we study the stability of the allocation methods. In particular, we recalculate the
allocations from the previous subsection for two distorted portfolios:
• Sensitivity 1: We eliminate 1,000 arbitrary sample realizations leaving us with 49,000 real-
izations.
• Sensitivity 2: We replace the five worst case (aggregate) scenarios with the sixth worst ag-
gregate scenario (so that our sample now contains six identical scenarios).
The intuition behind the first stability test is clear: An allocation should be robust to unsys-
tematic changes in the sample. When adding, changing, or subtracting from the sample in an
unsystematic way, we would hope to see the allocation staying more or less the same. And since
we cannot add to or change the sample because we do not know the data-generating process, we
subtract.
The second test is motivated by ideas from Kou et al. (2013), who discuss robustness proper-
ties of risk measures and—based on the observation that coherent risk measures are not always
robust—define so-called natural risk statistics. It is important to note that our angle is different in
that we consider allocations and not risk measures, even though the underlying issues are the same.
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Specifically, extreme tail scenarios are very hard to assess—for instance, even with 5,000 observa-
tions one can not distinguish between the Laplace distribution and the t-distributions (Heyde and
Kou, 2004). Therefore, modifications in the extreme tail should not have a tremendous impact on
the allocation.
As indicated in the previous subsection, we can identify allocations for our four business lines
with points in three dimensional space, and we can identify the “difference” between two allo-
cations with the (Euclidean) distance between the corresponding points. For a yardstick when
assessing allocations, note that the difference between the 90% TVaR and the 99% TVaR is 0.056,
which is thus a sizable difference. The difference between the 95% and the 99% TVaR is 0.026,
which is still considerable.
Figure 1.6 plots the distance between the allocations for the original portfolio and the modified
portfolio for both sensitivity portfolios and all considered allocations methods. Again, we find that
VaR-based allocations and the Exp3 allocation stand out as extreme outliers, though on different
tests. More specifically, VaR allocations respond particularly poorly to unsystematic changes in
the portfolio, whereas the exponential allocation is particularly sensitive to changes in the tail.
This contrasts with Kou et al. (2013), who argue that VaR has good robustness properties for risk
measurement. We eliminate (all) VaR-based and exponential allocations and plot the differences
for the remaining methods for both tests separately. Figure 1.7 displays the results.
Figure 1.7(a) shows the results for the (unsystematic) modification via eliminating 1,000 sam-
ples. We find that when ignoring VaR-based allocations, all methods are relatively stable. The max-
imal difference now is about 0.0025 which is not too sizable for the Myers-Read 2 allocation: the
corresponding allocation vectors are (7.56%;88.98%;4.44%;-0.97%) and (7.78%;88.85%;4.38%;-
1.01%), respectively.
In contrast, when eliminating tail scenarios, the impact can be considerable. Figure 1.7(b)
shows that in some cases it can amount to more than 0.04. The most sensitive methods are the
Myers-Read allocations, the D’Arcy allocations, the Esscher, and the Bauer-Zanjani allocation
for high α—all of which are “tail-focused.” However, we do not find the same for TVaR based
allocations, which again is contrary to the findings from Kou et al. (2013) for risk measurement.
Also noteworthy is the stability of the proportional hazard, the Wang, the Kamps, and the Bodoff
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allocations, so it appears that stability is less critical for non-tail-focused methods.
1.7 Conclusion
The actuarial literature entails numerous contributions on capital allocation. While the theoretical
questions are not settled and deserve continued attention, questions concerning implementation
issues have received much less attention in the literature but are of great importance to practitioners.
This chapter attempts to contribute by exploring differences and commonalities between various
methods that have been proposed.
We find substantial differences across the universe of methods, although we find that all allo-
cations appear systematically related in the context of our example. Stability issues, predictably,
arise in methods where allocations are keyed to one outcome or to a small set of outcomes—as is
the case with VaR-based allocations and allocations based on tail risk measures. While the analysis
here is based on specific data, we find the systematic relationship surprising and also encouraging
in view of the companies’ problem of choosing the “correct” method. More research is obviously
needed to verify whether these findings carry over to other situations.
1.8 Appendix A: Bauer-Zanjani Allocation Implementation
1.8.1 The Case of Heterogeneous Bernoulli Losses
We consider consumers that face Bernoulli distributed losses. We allow for heterogeneity in con-
sumer preferences as well as in the losses. More specifically, we assume that there are m groups of
consumers, where group i containsNi identical consumers with wealth levelwi and utility function
Ui() that face independent losses li occurring with a probability pii, i = 1, ...,m. The participation
constraint again is given by their autarky levels:
γi = E[Ui(wi − li)] = piiUi(wi − li) + (1− pii)Ui(wi).
The optimization problem in the one period model without a regulatory constraint can then be con-
veniently set up by observing that the number of losses in the different groups follow independent
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Binomial(Ni, pii) distributions.
For counterparty-based allocation, we obtain for each group i:
qiφ˜i = c˜
N1∑
k1=0
· · ·
Ni∑
ki=1
· · ·
Nm∑
km=0
(
N1
k1
)
· · ·
(
Ni − 1
ki − 1
)
· · ·
(
Nm
km
)
×pik11 · · · pikii · · · pikmm (1− pi1)N1−k1 · · · (1− pii)Ni−ki · · · (1− pim)Nm−km
×
1{∑ms=1 ksqsls≥a}

m∑
j=1
kjU
′
j
(
wj − pj − lj + qjlj a∑m
s=1 ksqsls
)
qjlj
v′j ×
∑m
s=1 ksqsls


× qili∑m
s=1 ksqsls
, (1.10)
where c˜ is a constant such that
∑
iNiqiφ˜i = 1.
1.8.2 The Case of Catastrophe Reinsurance Losses
We assume each line represents a counterparty with CARA preference. The indemnity of each
line follows the simulated distribution from the data. We consider the profit maximization problem
(1.8) and we can show that under CARA preference, the solution does not depend on initial wealth
and
pi =
1
αi
log
E[eαiL(i) ]
E[eαiL(i)(1−q(i))1{I≤a} + eαiL
(i)(1−q(i) a
I
)1{I>a}]
, i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Therefore, we can simplify the optimization problem (1.8) to five choice variables
a, q(1), q(2), q(3), q(4). The allocation are calculated based on optimized variables and equation (1.9).
1.9 Appendix B: Additional Tables and Figures
36
(a) All methods (w/o Exp3)
(b) Restricted methods (squared area in (a))
Figure 1.5: Comparison of allocations–catastrophe insurance losses
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Figure 1.6: Stability of allocations: distance between allocations on basic and modified portfolios for all
methods
(a) Sensitivity Test 1 (b) Sensitivity Test 2
Figure 1.7: Stability of allocations: distance between allocations on basic and modified portfolios for allo-
cation methods (except Exp and VaR)
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Chapter 2
The Term Structure of Capital Costs1
2.1 Introduction
How do financial institutions discount liability cash flows in the near and distant future? It has
long been established that capital costs are an important valuation component for financial institu-
tions facing risk, particularly in the insurance sector (Cummins and Phillips, 2005), and market-
consistent valuation frameworks such as IFRS 17 and Solvency II include corresponding “risk mar-
gins” for non-replicable risks (Albrecher et al., 2018).2 Such firm-specific risk penalties arise in
financial models with financing frictions (Froot and Stein, 1998; Zanjani, 2002; Bauer and Zanjani,
2016). However, thus far little is known about the effect of the markups on liabilities materializing
in the near and far future, that is, about the term structure of these capital costs. This essay closes
this gap in literature by analyzing how markups affect liabilities with different maturities, both
theoretically and empirically.
Relying on an extension of such risk management models with financial frictions, we devise
1This essay is co-authored with Daniel Bauer and George Zanjani. We gratefully acknowledge funding from the Casualty
Actuarial Society (CAS) under a Committee on Theory of Risk (COTOR) research project. A previous version of this essay was
circulated under the title “The Marginal Cost of Risk and Capital Allocation in a Property and Casualty Insurance Company.” We
are grateful for helpful comments from Tim Boonen, Alietia Caughron, Richard Derrig, Cameron Ellis, Michael Hoy, Dongchen
Li, Lawrence Marcus, Lawrence McTaggart, Stephen Mildenhall, Ajay Subramanian, Ruilin Tian, Mary Weiss, Huan Zhang and
seminar participants at the 2016 Insurance: Mathematics and Economics Congress (IME 2016), the 51st Actuarial Research Con-
ference (ARC 2016), the American Risk and Insurance Association (ARIA) 2016 Annual Meeting, the UGA 2017 Ph.D. Research
Symposium, Illinois State University, and the University of St. Thomas.
2Solvency II is a directive within the European Union that codifies and harmonizes insurance regulation. International Financial
Reporting Standard (IFRS) 17 is the new international accounting standard for insurance contracts, and particularly their valuation.
Both emphasize market-consistent valuation principles.
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a theoretical model for the firm-specific term structure of capital costs. We develop our theory
in the context of a property and casualty (P&C) insurer, which typically carry business lines that
vary in the length of time it takes for claims to be reported and to settle—referred to as short
and long tailed business lines.3 Hence, this industry provides an ideal laboratory setting for our
ideas, also since unique data are available due to regulatory reporting requirements. We estimate
discount curves (net of discounting at risk-free rates) that depend on firm characteristics. Our key
theoretical and empirical finding is that firms that face financial constraints include hefty markups
for liabilities in the near future, with a term structure that is rapidly declining. In contrast, well
capitalized firms include a relatively modest markup that is less steep over time—and can even
be negative and increasing for companies with extremely high capital levels. The key intuition is
that due to the generally profitable though risky business, capital costs—that are high for meagerly
capitalized firms and modest for well capitalized firms—have a mean-reverting character at the
firm level.
Within the theoretical model, we integrate a general P&C loss structure given via so-called loss
triangles into a dynamic profit maximization model for an insurer that economizes on different
capitalization options similar to that from Bauer and Zanjani (2018). The model is set in an eco-
nomic environment with financing frictions (Duffie, 2010), and includes both internal and external
capital that can be raised at different costs (Brunnermeier et al., 2012). We derive our key equation
of the marginal cost of risk from the company’s optimality conditions, along with a rule for the
economic allocation of capital to the different lines. In line with Bauer and Zanjani (2018), we
find that while the marginal cost takes the conventional form of the value of future liabilities plus
allocated capital costs, the company evaluates uncertain liabilities under adjusted probabilities that
reflect company effective risk aversion (Froot and Stein, 1998). However, we demonstrate that
the adjustment differs for payments due in the next year versus payments in future development
years, since the associated probability weights depend on the company’s (expected) financial sit-
uation. This difference in treatment for liabilities with different durations implies differences in
the assessment of shorter versus longer tailed business lines. In particular, both differences in the
3Indeed, this is one of the primary aspects addressed in the vast actuarial literature on loss reserving in non-life insurance. We
refer to the textbooks by Wu˝thrich and Merz (2008), Taylor (2012), and Radtke et al. (2016) for details.
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loss distribution as well as expected settlement times between business lines will interact with the
financial situation of the company to determine their valuations.
We explore this relationship by solving our model numerically in a setting with two business
lines and two development periods for the long-tailed line (2L2DY). More precisely, we consider
a business selling a workers’ compensation insurance as the long-tailed line, where we assume
that the losses develop according to a Chain-Ladder model with jointly normal innovations (Mack,
1993), and selling commercial automobile insurance as the short-tailed line. We implement the
firm’s profit maximization problem by dynamic programming on a discretized state space. In
line with Bauer and Zanjani (2018), we find that the value of the P&C insurer is concave with
an optimal point that results from balancing profit expectations and capital costs. However, our
differentiation between the long- and short-tailed business lines allows for analyzing the impact of
firm capitalization on the optimal line mix. We find that exposure in the long-tailed line—where
payments occur further in the future—is relatively higher for financially constrained firms, whereas
the opposite is true for the short-tailed line. This is due to the former facing high capital costs in
the short-term and lower capital costs in the long term, so that ”delaying” indemnity payments by
increasing exposure to the long-tailed line is optimal.
To obtain firm-specific markups empirically, we aggregate the marginal cost equation across
lines so that we express aggregate company premiums in terms of expected aggregate discounted
liability payments and capital costs—where the expected value features risk adjustment terms due
to future capital costs. We can then identify a firm-specific term structure of risk adjustments
since different companies have a different mix of business lines, so that the risk adjustment terms
will have a different impact on the firm’s right-hand side of marginal cost equation. We rely
on a simple version of the term structure specification by Nelson and Siegel (1987), where the
parameters depend on firm capitalization as measured by the surplus to asset ratio or the leverage
ratio. Our estimation delivers current period industry cost-of-capital, and parameters governing the
company-specific term structure as a function of firm characteristics.
Our industry cost of capital figures vary between 7.5% and 13%, depending on the considered
year. The term structure of firm-specific markups differs markedly in the financial situation of
the firm. More precisely, for a firm with an average capitalization level (equity to asset ratio '
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0.5), its valuation of near-future (due in 1-3 years) liabilities is 20-80% higher than their present
values. However, for liabilities that are due much later (in 4-10 years), the markups are around
10-20% or even less. This pattern is similar for poorly capitalized firms, although here short-term
markups are even higher and the term structure is even more steeply downward sloping. For firms
with high capitalization level, in contrast, we observe much lower markup levels overall—and they
may even display markdowns with an a upward sloping term structure. That is, extremely well
capitalized firms may evaluate near-term liabilities below their expected discounted value, though
this markdown subsides for liabilities in the far future. The findings are in line with our theory, and
they are robust to the inclusion of additional firm characteristics.
Related Literature and Organization of the Essay
This essay relates to several strands of literature. First, we bring together economic approaches
for risk pricing in financial institutions with actuarial loss forecasting methods, for the purpose
of deriving the term structure of capital costs in P&C insurance. A seminal contribution with
regards to the former literature is Froot and Stein (1998), who present economic foundations for
risk pricing in a setting with costly capital. We directly build on the dynamic extension of Froot and
Stein’s work by Bauer and Zanjani (2018), where different modes of capitalization are included.
The actuarial literature on loss forecasting and claims reserving methods is extensive (Taylor and
Ashe, 1983; Wu˝thrich and Merz, 2008; Radtke et al., 2016, e.g.). We rely on the common Chain-
Ladder forecasting approach (Mack, 1993), although generalizations are possible.
The empirical section borrows from the literature on yield curve specification and estimation,
particularly from Nelson and Siegel (1987). The drivers for the choice between long- and short
tailed lines and associated costs relate to the the finance literature on debt maturity (Custo´dio et al.,
2013; Mian and Santos, 2011; Xu, 2016). Finally, we contribute to the literature on cost of capital
estimation in the insurance sector (Cox and Griepentrog, 1988; Cummins and Lamm-Tennant,
1994; Lee and Cummins, 1998; Cummins and Phillips, 2005). In particular, while we rely on
a completely different approach, it is comforting that resulting figures fall in the same region as
previous estimates.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the term structure
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equation derived from a general model of multi-period profit maximization with a general loss
structure in a P&C company, an implementation of the model and numerical results; Section 2.3
presents details of the empirical study on estimating the term structure of capital costs; Section 2.4
concludes.
2.2 Multi-Period Profit Maximization with Loss History
2.2.1 Loss Structure for a P&C Company
Setting up a profit maximization framework for a P&C company requires modeling the asset and
the liability sides. For simplicity, we assume the company’s assets bear no risk and that all the
uncertainty originates from the liability side, modeled via claim payment amounts.
A P&C company writes new insurance contracts in each of its business lines at the beginning
of every year (accident year), during which accidents occur and losses are reported. However,
some of the losses are not reported until the next year or even years after the origination of the
contract. Furthermore, only a portion of the payments is settled in the accident year, whereas the
remainder of the (unrealized) payments will take several years to settle. The lags in reporting
and paying losses are accounted for by considering so-called loss development years. Such a loss
structure is typically represented via so-called loss triangles, with one triangle recording incurred
(reported) losses, and another triangle recording paid losses. To illustrate, in Figure 2.1 we consider
a P&C insurance company with N business lines with corresponding (paid) loss random variables
L
(n,i+j−1)
i,j , with line identifier n = 1, 2, . . . , N , accident year (AY) i = 1, 2, . . . , t− dn, . . . , t, . . . ,
development year (DY) j = 1, 2, . . . , dn, and i + j − 1 being the calendar year (period). For each
variable, we only need to identify the development and calendar year and thus drop the accident
year subscripts for simplicity.
In the paid loss triangle, for example, L(n,1)1 to L
(n,dn)
dn
denote amounts paid (if positive, or
amount received if negative) for insurance sold at the beginning of year 1 in line n. Thus, ev-
ery year, there are payments for losses incurred in the current year, as well as for losses devel-
oped from previous years. Specifically, payments in the same calendar year consist of the diag-
onal entries in the paid loss triangle. For example, payments in calendar year t correspond to
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Figure 2.1: Loss triangle for a P&C insurer in business line n with t accident years and dn development
years
(L
(n,t)
1 , L
(n,t)
2 , . . . , L
(n,t)
dn
), which are double-boxed inside Figure 2.1. L(n,t)1 represents losses from
the contract sold in period t. Other losses (L(n,t)2 , . . . , L
(n,t)
dn
) are developed from previous years’
losses, which are in oval boxes and themselves make up a triangle in Figure 2.1. We denote this
“historical” loss triangle at time t−1 as ∆(n,t−1) = {L(n,i)j , t−dn+1 ≤ i ≤ t−1}, which contains
(partial) loss information from t − dn + 1 to t − 1 and is the only source of uncertainty. Denote
L(n,t) = (L
(n,t)
2 , . . . , L
(n,t)
dn
) as losses paid in year t that developed from ∆(n,t−1). To account for
the loss development in each accident year, it is common to assume that the paid losses triangles
have a Markov structure:
P(∆(n,t)|∆(n,t−1),∆(n,t−2), . . . ,∆(n,1)) = P(∆(n,t)|∆(n,t−1)).
Also, as is common, we assume independence across accident years. A Markov structure and the
independence assumptions together fit most of the loss reserving methods in the P&C industry. It
is possible to relax the independence assumption and allow cross-sectional correlations between
accident years, at the cost of more complex derivations.
Under independence and Markov assumptions, loss random variables in each accident year are
44
related as follows:
P
(
L
(n,t)
j | h(L(n,t−j+1:t−1)1:j−1 ), . . . , h(L(n,t−j+1)1 )
)
= P
(
L
(n,t)
j | h(L(n,t−j+1:t−1)1:j−1 ))
)
.
The losses in the jth development year only depend on the information of the same accident year
and on a function h of loss information on the previous development years. For example, in the
most popular stochastic loss reserving method, the so-called Chain-Ladder approach (Mack, 1993),
h is the cumulative summation operation:
P
(
L
(n,t)
j | h(L(n,t−j+1:t−1)1:j−1 ), . . . , h(L(n,t−j+1)1 )
)
= P
(
L
(n,t)
j |
j−1∑
k=1
L
(n,t−k)
k
)
.
2.2.2 A Multi-Line Multi-Period Profit Maximization Model
To fully describe the dynamic liabilities that the P&C company faces, we assume the following
underwriting process: At the beginning of every period t, the insurer chooses to underwrite certain
amounts in each line of business and charges premium p(n,t) in return. The underwriting deci-
sion corresponds to choosing an exposure parameter q(n,t). The losses will be realized over the
development years, but the payments are always contingent on the exposure parameter and paid
loss random variables. Also note that in each period, the total indemnity payment includes losses
incurred and paid in the current year, as well as losses developed from the past years and to be paid
in the current calendar year. Thus, for business line n in period t, the indemnity payment can be
presented via the following function I(n)t (.):
I(n,t) = I(n,t)
{q(n,t), L(n,t)1︸ ︷︷ ︸
current
}, {Q(n,t−1),L(n,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
history
}
 ,
where we assume I(n,t) ({q(n,t), 0}, {Q(n,t−1),0}) = 0. Q(n,t−1) is the vector of exposure pa-
rameters associated with triangle ∆(n,t−1) and losses L(n,t). In what follows, we will assume that
indemnity payments are proportional to the exposure parameters:
I(n,t) = q(n,t) × L(n,t)1 +Q(n,t−1) × L(n,t),
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but generalizations are possible at the expense of a more cumbersome analysis (Frees, 2017;
Mildenhall, 2017). We denote the aggregate period indemnity across business lines by I(,t) =∑N
n=1 I
(n,t).4
The company collects the full premium p(n,t) at the beginning of each period t on each line.
The aggregate period premium is p(,t) =
∑N
n=1 p
(n,t). The company can raise capital B(t) ≥ 0 (or
shed capital B(t) < 0). The cost of raising capital B(t) is c(B(t)) if B(t) ≥ 0. There is no cost of
shedding capital, i.e. c(B(t)) = 0 if B(t) < 0. The company carries over capital a(t−1)(1− τ) from
the last period, with τ denoting the unit frictional cost of internal capital. Raising external capital is
always marginally more expensive than keeping internal capital, so we always have c′(.) > τ > 0.
Thus, the company’s assets at the beginning of period t are
a(t−1)(1− τ) +B(t) − c(B(t)) + p(,t).
During period t, the assets are invested at a fixed annual interest rate r. At the end of period t, the
company pays the aggregate indemnity I(,t) from its insurance policies sold in the current period
and previous periods. The surplus of assets over aggregate indemnity, denoted by a(t), can then be
carried over to period t+ 1. Thus, we have the following law of motion for the company’s capital:
a(t) =
(
a(t−1)(1− τ) +B(t) − c1(B(t)) + p(,t)
)
(1 + r)− I(,t), (2.1)
assuming a(t) ≥ 0. If the company defaults, it pays out all remaining assets to policyholders. The
company cannot shed more capital than it has available. Hence, for a(t−1) ≥ 0, we require that:
B(t) ≥ −a(t−1)(1− τ). (2.2)
The objective function for each period can be derived using the revenue (premium collected),
minus the costs (indemnity, frictional costs on carrying capital, and financing costs). For each
4In the rest of the essay, we use X(,t) as the sum across the lines
∑N
n=1 X
(n,t). X(:,t) is used to represent the line-by-line
collection (vector) (X(1,t), . . . , X(N,t)), and its subset X(m:n,t) = (X(m,t), . . . , X(n,t)). X(n,t:t+s) represents a collection of
random variables over discrete time (X(n,t), X(n,t+1), . . . , X(n,t+s)).
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period, the expected aggregate indemnity takes the following form:
e(t) = E
[
I(,t)1{a(1)≥0,...,a(t)≥0} + (a(t) + I(,t))1{a(1)≥0,...,a(t)<0} | ∆(:,t−1)
]
.
Note that here we write the remaining assets in case of default as a(t) + I(,t) < I(,t).
Hence, the company’s period profit function f is:
f(st = {a(t−1),Q(:,t−1),∆(:,t−1)}, ct = {q(:,t), p(:,t), B(t)})
= (1 + r)p(,t) − e(t) − (1 + r)(τa(t−1) + c(B(t)))
= E
[
1{a(1)≥0,...,a(t)≥0}{(1 + r)p(,t) − I(,t) − (1 + r)(τa(t−1) + c(B(t)))}
− 1{a(1)≥0,...,a(t)<0}(1 + r)(a(t−1) +B(t)) | st
]
. (2.3)
The state “st” contains all the variables that determine the state of the company at the beginning
of period t. The control “ct” contains all the variables that the company chooses in maximizing the
objective function, also at the beginning of period t. In particular, both st and ct are predictable
with the information from the loss triangle ∆(:,t−1). The insurance company’s ultimate objective
is to maximize future expected discounted cash flows, which corresponds to the following infinite
horizon optimization problem:
max
ct
∞∑
t=1
E[βtf(st, ct)], (2.4)
where β = (1 + r)−1 is the discount factor. The objective function can be equivalently represented
as present value of future dividends as follows:
max
ct
E
[∑
t≤t∗
−βt−1B(t) − a(0)
]
, (2.5)
where t∗ is the time such that a(1) ≥ 0, a(2) ≥ 0, . . . , a(t∗−1) ≥ 0, a(t∗) < 0 (see Appendix 2.5.1 for
the proof).
We solve the optimization with constraints (2.1), (2.2), a premium function for each line n, and
a regulatory constraint if needed. For the premium function, we follow Bauer and Zanjani (2018)
and assume that the premium charged for one line is the expected present (actuarial) value of future
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losses multiplied by a markup function. The present value of future losses for each line at the end
of period t can be represented as
R(n,t) =
dn∑
j=1
βj−1q(n,t)L(n,t+j−1)j .
The markup function is a (decreasing) function of company risk φ and size θ = E
[
R(,t) | ∆(:,t−1)],
defined as
pi(n) = pi(n)(φ, θ),
with the assumption on partial derivatives:
pi
(n)
1 =
∂pi(n)(φ, θ)
∂φ
< 0, and pi(n)2 =
∂pi(n)(φ, θ)
∂θ
< 0,
so a company with greater risk and larger size charges a smaller markup over actuarial value.
φ is a risk metric that measures the risk of a company given its total indemnities and assets.
For measuring “risk,” we assume that the policyholders are concerned with the company’s period
solvency, so that the risk depends on total indemnities paid I(,t) and total end-of-periods assets
S(t):
φ = φ(I(,t), S(t)),
where S(t) =
(
a(t−1)(1− τ) +B(t) − c(B(t)) + p(,t)) (1+r). Here, similarly to Bauer and Zanjani
(2018), in addition to obvious monotonicity assumptions (φ(I, x) ≤ φ(I, x), x ≥ y, and φ(X, x) ≤
φ(Y, x), X ≤ Y ), we assume scale invariance of the risk metric, i.e. φ(aI, ax) = φ(I, x), a > 0.
The key example that we will rely on in our numerical applications is the conditional default
probability:
φ(I(,t), S(t)) = P(I(,t) > S(t) | ∆(:,t−1)).
We note that this specification assumes consumers are myopic in that they are only concerned with
the coming period—and not necessary the performance of their contract. This may be justified
with the assumption that consumers rely on company ratings that obviously do not depend on the
term of the obligation.
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Altogether, we have the following premium function for line n:
p(n,t) = E
[
βR(n,t) | ∆(:,t−1)]× pi(n)(φ, θ). (2.6)
According to Bertsekas (1995), the optimization problem (2.4) is an infinite-horizon discrete-
time stochastic optimal control problem, resulting in the following Bellman equation:
Proposition 1. (Bellman Equation). The Bellman equation for problem (2.4) reads:
V (a(t−1),Q(:,t−1),∆(:,t−1))
= max
q(:,t),p(:,t),B(t)
E
[
1{I(,t)≤S(t)}
(
p(,t) − βI(,t) − τa(t−1) − c(B(t)) + βV (a(t),Q(:,t),∆(:,t))
)
− 1{I(,t)>S(t)}(a(t−1) +B(t)) | ∆(:,t−1)
]
,
subject to (2.1), (2.2), and (2.6)
Here the default threshold for the company is S(t). Once the aggregate indemnity is greater
than S(t), the company defaults. We do not consider the option of raising emergency capital to
save the company as in Bauer and Zanjani (2018), since the focus of this essay is on how loss
history, i.e. past exposures Q(:,t−1) and losses ∆(:,t−1), affect the optimal exposure, raising, and
allocation decisions. However, incorporating emergency capital is theoretically straightforward.
In particular, when incorporating emergency raising capital, we note that the model in Bauer and
Zanjani (2018) will be a special case of the general model here with one development year in all
business lines, thus effectively reducing the value function to one dimension with a(t−1). In our
general setting, with the company having N lines and each line n having dn development years,
there are a total of 1 + 1
2
∑N
n=1(d
2
n + dn − 2) state variables.
2.2.3 Term Structure of Capital Costs
We rely on the first order conditions of the Bellman equation in Proposition (1) to derive the
marginal cost of risk (the proof is provided in Appendix 2.5.1).
Proposition 2. (Term Structure Equation). We have the marginal cost of risks presented in the form
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of term structure of capital costs:
E
[
dn∑
j=1
βjL
(n,t+j−1)
j | ∆(:,t−1)
]
∗ pi(n)
(
1 +
N∑
i=1
pi
(i)
2
pi(n)
E
[
R(i,t) | ∆(:,t−1)
])
=
dn−1∑
s=0
(1− c′(B(t))) ·
(
E
[
1{I(,t)≤S(t),...,I∗(,t+s)≤S∗(t+s)}β
s+1L
(n,t+s)
s+1 wt+s | ∆(:,t−1)
]
+ β
∂ρ(I(,t))
∂q(n,t)
E
[
1{I(,t)>S(t)}wt | ∆(:,t−1)
])
, (2.7)
where wt =

1 + V1(a
(t),Q(:,t),∆(:,t)) I(,t) ≤ S(t)
∑N
i=1
1
1−c′(B(t))E
[
R(i,t) | ∆(:,t−1)] ∗ pi(i)1 ∂φ∂S(t) I(,t) > S(t),
ρ is the risk measure associated with the risk metric φ, and V1 = ∂V/∂a.
wt is a weighting function similar to the function in Bauer and Zanjani (2018), with
E
[
(1− c′(B(t)))wt
]
= 1.
The weighting function wt+s = 1 + V1(a∗(t+s),Q∗(:,t+s),∆∗(:,t+s)) on I(,t) ≤ S(t), . . . , I∗(,t+s) ≤
S∗(t+s) from time t to t+dn−1, where a∗(t+s),Q∗(:,t+s) etc. are the (stochastic) future state variables
under the optimal policy.
The left-hand side of the equation represents the marginal premium income, adjusted down by
company size. The first line of the right-hand side of the equation consists of evaluation of future
losses for accident year t, namely, losses (L(n,t)1 , L
(n,t+1)
2 , . . . , L
(n,t+dn−1)
dn
), which are dependent
through a stochastic loss reserving model. The last line of the right-hand side of the equation are
about the capital allocation ∂ρ(I
∗(,t))
∂q(n,t)
multiplied by associated capital costs.
The interpretation of the term structure equation is that valuation of liability and capital al-
location should be done by line and development year in each line, in contrast to the previous
literature, where only by-line allocation is considered. Not only does the equation highlight the
importance of loss reserving in pricing P&C insurance, but it also redefines the capital allocation
and risk pricing goal in a P&C insurer. We are interested in the term structure of capital costs,
namely V1(a∗(t+s),Q∗(:,t+s),∆∗(:,t+s)) and how it varies with capitalization level. In what follows,
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we solve a basic version of our theoretical model numerically, we explore insurer’s decision at
optimality, and we analyze how V1 behaves in a dynamic setting.
2.2.4 Implementation – Two Lines and Two Development Years
In this section, we provide an implementation of our theory in the previous section in the context of
a P&C insurer. Specifically, the P&C insurer has two business lines and two development years on
the long-tailed line (2L2DY). We then calibrate and solve for the model using numerical methods.
In 2L2DY, Line 1 is the long-tailed line with development year loss, the paid loss triangle is
a 2x1 triangle, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. Line 2 is assumed to be the short-tailed line with no
development years beyond the accident year. The time period equals to AY + DY - 1. Therefore,
at the end of current period t, the insurer faces losses L(1,t)1 and L
(1,t)
2 from its long-tailed line 1,
and L(2,t)1 from its short-tailed line 2. The loss random variables above the solid lines in Figure 2.2
are realized before t. The grayed-out L(1,t+1)2 is not a part of the loss triangle and not realized until
the end of the next period t+ 1, but it is relevant to the premium written for the accident year t and
therefore related to the insurer’s problem.
Line 1
HHHHHHAY
DY
1 2
1 L(1,1)1 L
(1,2)
2
. . . . . . . . .
t-2 L(1,t−2)1 L
(1,t−1)
2
t-1 L(1,t−1)1 L
(1,t)
2
t L(1,t)1 L
(1,t+1)
2
Line 2
HHHHHHAY
DY
1
1 L(2,1)1
. . . . . .
t-2 L(2,t−2)1
t-1 L(2,t−1)1
t L(2,t)1
Figure 2.2: Losses for a company under 2L2DY
Line 1
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DY
1 2
t-1 L(1)1 L
(1)
2
t L
′(1)
1 L
′(1)
2
Line 2
HHHHHHAY
DY
1
t-1 L(2)1
t L
′(2)
1
Figure 2.3: Losses relevant to the bellman equation for a company under 2L2DY
We simplify notations L(n,t−2+j)j to L
(n)
j and L
(n,t−1+j)
j to L
′(n)
j , shown in Figure 2.3, as the
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prime “′” denotes state variables in the next period. We put three assumptions on loss triangles: (i)
Chain-Ladder in loss development; (ii) conditional normality of loss distribution; (iii) linear corre-
lation between lines. These assumptions make the model tractable and more efficient to calculate
the moments of loss random variables in the Bellman equation. Details of three distributional
assumptions are presented in Appendix 2.5.2 and useful in developing numerical solutions.
All in all, we solve the following simplified Bellman equation:
V (a, q(1), L
(1)
1 ) (2.8)
= max
q
′(1),q′(2),p(1),p(2),B
βE
[
1{I≤S}(S − I) + 1{I≤S}V (a′, q′(1), L
′(1)
1 )
]
− a−B,
where:
S = (a(1− τ) +B − c1(B) + p(1) + p(2))er a′ = S − I.
For the premium functions, akin to Bauer and Zanjani (2018), we assume the following specifica-
tion:
pn = E
[
βR(n)
]
× exp
{
αn − δnP(I > S)− γnE[R]
}
, n = 1, 2
where R(1) = q′(1)L
′(1)
1 + βq
′(1)L
′(1)
2 , R
(2) = q
′(2)L
′(2)
1 , and R = R
(1) + R(2) representing the
aggregate risk in the premium p1 + p2. Note that the aggregate risk R does not equal to the
aggregate indemnity I , because of the long-tailed line. I reflects losses to be paid out in the current
time period, while R entails risks exposed in one accident year across two periods. E[R], instead
of E[I] used in the models without development year, reflects the aggregate scale of the insurance
business. The motivation for this specification is that policyholders assess company quality via
ratings that reflect the default probability, and increasing the scale of insurance business decreases
profit margins. We then can specify the premium function as the product of expected present value
of future exposed losses and a corresponding markup function.
In the numerical implementation, we calibrate the 2L2DY model with premium parameters,
loss triangle parameters and company level parameters listed in Table 2.1. We choose the same
premium parameters for both lines. Although a generalization to two distinct sets of premium
parameters is possible, it complicates the model solution and may yield results that are difficult
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Long-Tailed Line Short-Tailed Line
Premium
α 0.1 0.1
β -10.0 -10.0
γ -5.0E-10 -5.0E-10
Triangle
f 2.0 N/A
σ2 2.5E7 N/A
µ
(n)
1 1.0E8 1.0E8
(σ
(n)
1 )
2 6.25E14 6.25E14
ρ 0.5
Company
τ 0.03
c
(1)
1 0.075
c
(2)
1 1E-10
Table 2.1: Model parameters
to interpret. We leave corresponding extensions for future research. We set the capital costs as
τ = 0.03, c(1)1 = 0.075, c
(2)
1 = 1.0E−10, and the risk-free interest rate is r = 0.03, as in the
“base case” scenario in Bauer and Zanjani (2018). We then use value iteration method to solve
the Bellman equation (2.8) numerically on discretized grids of a ∈ [0, 2.0E9], q(1) ∈ [0, 2.0], and
L(1) ∈ [5.0E7, 1.5E8]. A detailed solution to the 2L2DY model and corresponding numerical
techniques are detailed in Appendix 2.5.3.
2.2.5 Results – Two Lines and Two Development Years
Since the value function and optimal policies are functions of three state variables, it is impossible
to capture the results in a single graph. Therefore, we graph functions of capital a and previous
exposure on the long-tailed line q(1) on the x and y axis, given two extreme levels of the previous
shock L(1)1 (large and small). Figure 2.4 shows the value function and optimal policies under
an extremely small previous shock of two standard deviations below the mean at L(1)1 = 5.0E7.
Figure 2.8 shows the solution under an extremely large previous shock of two standard deviations
above the mean at L(1)1 = 1.5E8. We choose extreme levels to documents the effects.
The value function, optimal raising of external capital, and exposure to the short-tailed line all
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match the corresponding characteristics in Bauer and Zanjani (2018). More precisely, the value
function is concave with an optimal capitalization level that economizes on costly external financ-
ing, internal capital costs, and an optimal company size. The firm raises capital if it is severely
underfunded or sheds capital (pays dividends) if it is severely overfunded, but remains inactive
for capitalization levels around the optimal point. The optimal exposure to the short-tailed line is
concave and increasing in the capital level, up to a saturation point where costs associated with
scale do not warrant further expansion.
However, the solution here additionally provides insights on how previous exposure in the long-
tailed line affect the value function and optimal policies. The ridge in Figures 2.4(a) and 2.8(a)
depict the “optimal capital line”, which connects a’s that maximize V under q(1) ∈ [0, 2.0]. To the
left of the line, firm value decreases with capital, reflecting the cost of raising external financing;
to the right of the line, firm value decreases as the capital level increases, reflecting the cost of
carrying internal capital. The optimal capitalization point increases in both the previous exposure
q(1) and the loss realization L(1)1 . The pattern is also shown in two-dimensional Figures 2.5(a) and
2.9(a).
The optimal capital raising decision is slightly more subtle as seen from Figures 2.4(b) and
2.8(b). While with a higher previous exposure on long-tailed line, the company will keep more
capital and will start raising capital earlier, with lower previous exposure the company will raise
more aggressively for low capital levels. This reflects the increased value with limited loss legacy.
The optimal long-tailed line exposure is depicted in Figures 2.4(c) and 2.8(c). Interestingly,
the optimal exposure is strictly increasing with previous exposure when the capital level is low—
which may be counterintuitive at first sight. As the insurer starts out with low capital, it would
sell more insurance on the long-tailed line, less on short-tailed line and raise external capital. The
reason is that the insurer will be paying 100% of the loss incurred in the short-tailed line, but only
a fraction of the loss incurred in the short-tailed line, while it earns full premium on both lines. As
a result, the long-tailed line offers a relatively attractive source of financing for a firm in need of
funds. In other words, the long-tailed line can serve to gain short-term financing, at lower cost than
raising external capital. This effect is more pronounced for a high previous exposure, since more
short-term financing is needed.
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(a) Value function (b) External capital
(c) Line 1 (long-tailed) exposure (d) Line 2 (short-tailed) exposure
Figure 2.4: Value function, optimal external capital raising and exposure decision under small previous
shock
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(a) Function of a (b) Function of q(1)
Figure 2.5: 2-dimensional representations of value function (small previous shock)
(a) Function of a (b) Function of q(1)
Figure 2.6: 2-dimensional representations of long-tailed line exposure (small previous shock)
(a) Function of a (b) Function of q(1)
Figure 2.7: 2-dimensional representations of short-tailed line exposure (small previous shock)
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(a) Value function (b) External capital
(c) Line 1 (long-tailed) exposure (d) Line 2 (short-tailed) exposure
Figure 2.8: Value function, optimal external capital raising and exposure decision under large previous shock
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(a) Function of a (b) Function of q(1)
Figure 2.9: 2-dimensional representations of value function (large previous shock)
(a) Function of a (b) Function of q(1)
Figure 2.10: 2-dimensional representations of long-tailed line exposure (large previous shock)
(a) Function of a (b) Function of q(1)
Figure 2.11: 2-dimensional representations of short-tailed line exposure (large previous shock)
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When the capital is over optimal capital line, the optimal exposure to the long-tailed line in-
creases first with previous long-tailed line exposure and then decreases. The need for financing
declines and the insurer’s objective is to balance the current long-tailed line exposure and previous
one. Thus, when the previous exposure is too high, the insurer chooses to decrease the current ex-
posure to long-tailed line business. In particular, Figure 2.6(b) shows that while optimal exposure
to line 1 is increasing in previous exposure for low a, the relationship inverts for large capital level
a. Similarly, for high capital levels, optimal exposure to the long-tailed line becomes flat as shown
in Figure 2.6(a).
The optimal exposure to the short-tailed line complements with the optimal exposure to the
short-tailed line as evident from Figures 2.4(d) and 2.8(d). As a company has more exposure
on its long-tailed line in the last period, it will be responsible for a greater amount of indemnity
developed from the last period. As a result, the insurer will keep more capital and reduce exposure
on its short-tailed line business. When the capital is high, the insurer would increase its short-
tailed line exposure as it complements with decreasing long-tailed line exposure, as we observe
at a = 1E09 in Figure pairs 2.6(b) & 2.7(b), and 2.10(b) & 2.11(b). In terms of exposure with
respect to capital, we can see in Figures 2.7(a) and 2.11(a) that the optimal short-tailed exposure
increases with capital but becomes flat when the capital is over optimal capital line, similar to the
findings in Bauer and Zanjani (2018). Most evidently in Figure 2.11(a) when q(1) = 2 and capital
is low, it is optimal for the insurer to almost completely shut down the short-tailed line. On the
other hand, when the capital is high, it is optimal for the insurer to almost completely shut down
the long-tailed line, as seen in Figure 2.10(a).
The value function also provides insight to the term structure of capital costs. According to
the term structure equation in Section 2.2.3, the gradient of value function with respect to capital
V1 forms the term structure of capital costs. Because of the concavity of the value function with
respect to capital as seen in Figures 2.5(a) and 2.9(a), when the company is undercapitalized or its
capital is less than the optimal capitalization level, then V1 > 0 and the company effectively apply
markup to losses in premium pricing. On the other hand, when the company is overcapitalized
or its capital is more than the optimal capitalization level, then V1 < 0 and the company marks
down on losses. Specifically in Figure 2.9(a), we observe that the value function displays greater
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At the beginning of period t At the end of period t At the end of period t+ 1
Financially constrained 0.0254 -0.0170
Well capitalized -0.0303 -0.0196
Table 2.2: Numerical calculation of V1
concavity when q(1) is high, thus larger V1, than when q(1) is low. As a result, the term structure
of capital costs is higher for firms that are financially constrained, lower for firms that are better
capitalized, and even negative for firms that are extremely well capitalized.
The natural next steps would be finding the term structure numerically by calculating V1 for
every development year. However, for our 2L2DY implementation, we can only obtain numerical
calculation of V1 for two periods. A sample calculation is shown in Table 2.2. When the company
begins the period with financial constraint, i.e. with low capitalization and high past exposure,
V1 at the end of the period is positive. For a company that starts with high capital and low past
exposure, V1 at the end of the period is positive. Both V1’s turn closer to zero at the end of period
t + 1. From the sample numerical results, we can see a downward sloping V1 for a financially
constrained company, who puts more adjustment to the expected losses in the current period than
the next period. On the other hand, we can see an upward sloping V1 for the well capitalized
company. Alas, the numerical calculation provides very limited information on the term structure,
which ideally spans for ten years for a P&C company. If we set out to numerically solve for a 10-
year term structure, it requires implementation of full 10×10 loss triangle. As discussed in Section
2.2.2, we will face a model with more than 100 state variables and such model is impossible to
be solved using dynamic programming approach. Instead, in the next section, we propose an
estimation of the term structure of capital costs in an empirical setting. Our empirical findings are
in line with our theoretical results.
2.3 Empirical Study
An insurer relies on premium income, and also capital to support its expected future losses. Capi-
tals are costly to hold, but necessary to obtain whenever the insurance businesses are less profitable
and/or the insurer does not do well financially. In calculating how much premium to charge for
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additional exposure in future losses, a company considers valuation other than simply pricing at
actuarial value of expected future losses. The reason is that companies are risk averse about loss
shocks that may happen in the future. If such shocks occur, they consume capital quickly and will
put the companies at great risk of default and/or out of competition. For most companies, the losses
to be paid out in the near future (e.g. 1-3 years) are of the most concern and companies choose
to price them higher than their actuarial value, while losses to be paid out in the far future (e.g.
4-10 years) are priced closer to their actuarial value. We are interested in how a P&C company
weighs on their valuation of expected future losses at different point of time, and how the valuation
changes among companies with different capitalization levels.
Our theoretical finding, i.e. term structure equation (2.7), shows that the valuation of loss re-
serve in each line of business involves two discount factors. The first one is a yield curve, in our
theory being flat at r. The second is a term structure of future losses, described in our theory by(
1 + V1(a
(t),Q(:,t),∆(:,t))
)
from t to t+ dn − 1. Since V1 is ∂V/∂a and does not vary by business
lines, the term structure summarizes the sensitivity of premium (aggregate/by line) to future losses
(aggregate/by line) from development year 1 to dn. Although it makes sense to generalize term
structures of future losses by line, in this essay we remain focus on finding a term structure at com-
pany level for different years. Our goal is to estimate the sensitivity of premium to the expected
future losses and capital in a P&C company in an empirical study.
Now, we start from identifying the variables of interest and back out an equation for estimation.
From our theoretical results (2.7), multiplying exposure q(n,t) to both sides of the equation and
summing up by line, we obtain the following equation:
N∑
n=1
E
[
dn∑
j=1
βjq(n,t)L
(n,t+j−1)
j | ∆(:,t−1)
]
∗ pi(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Premium
(
1 +
N∑
i=1
pi
(i)
2
pi(n)
E
[
R(i,t) | ∆(:,t−1)
])
=
N∑
n=1
dn−1∑
s=0
(1− c′(B(t))) · E
[
1{I(,t)≤S(t),...,I∗(,t+s)≤S∗(t+s)}β
s+1q(n,t)L
(n,t+s)
s+1
(
1 + V
(t+s)
1
)
| ∆(:,t−1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Valuation of Total Loss Reserve
+ βρ(I(,t))
(
1− E
[
1{I(,t)≤S(t)}
(
1 + V
(t)
1
)
(1− c′(B(t))) | ∆(:,t−1)
])
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Capital Costs
(2.9)
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We obtain total premium for all lines plus a fraction on the left-hand-side and valuation of
loss reserve plus capital costs on the right-hand-side. The left-hand side of Equation 2.9 can
be identified using net premium written for all lines in company i in a given year, denoted by
Pi =
∑N
n=1 Pn,i, where Pn,i is the net premium written for line n. The capital costs component
on the right-hand side is identified using capital/surplus of a company multiplied by unit cost of
capital or return-on-capital, which is a parameter to be estimated. We denote surplus for company
i as SURPi and unit cost as c.
Next, we wish to identify both the expected future losses component and term structure com-
ponent V (t+s)1 . The expected paid loss can be identified/constructed using chain-ladder approach.
Specifically, we use the following relationships introduced in the numerical implementation sec-
tion:
E
[
L
(n,t)
1
]
= p(n,t) · f1
E
[
s∑
m=1
L(n,t+m−1)m |
s−1∑
m=1
L(n,t+m−1)m
]
=
s−1∑
m=1
L(n,t+m−1)m · fm+1, m = 1, 2, . . . , dn − 1,
where fs’s are the chain-ladder factor estimated using loss triangles in the last 10 years. Thus, in
addition to the chain-ladder factors, we need the premium for each line and we use net premium
written Pn,i The interest rate discount factor β, though being flat in our theoretical model, can be
identified using FRED yield curve of a given year, with m-year yield denoted by rm. We denote
expected future loss (adjusted for interest rate discount and without adjustment for term structure
of reserve) for company i as ELi with definition:
ELi =
N∑
n=1
(
(1 + r1)
−1Pn,i · f1 +
dn∑
m=2
(1 + rm)
−mPn,i · f1 · · · · · fm−1 · (fm − 1)
)
.
We use the following function from Nelson and Siegel (1987) to start identifying the term
structure component.
g(m; β0, β1, β2, τ) =
(
β0 + β1
(
1− e−mτ
m
τ
)
+ β2
(
1− (m+ τ)e−mτ
m
))
, m ∈ (0,∞).
Even though more complex modelings of yield curve have developed, the above function pro-
62
vides a flexible fit for any yield curve while adds minimum complexity to the overall modeling. β0
describes the long-term value of f (as m goes to infinity). β0 + β1 describes the short-term value
of f (as m goes to zero). β2 gives f function a hump or S shape. τ can be understood as a tuning
parameter that determines how quickly the curve decays from the short-term value to its long-term
value.
To help with our estimation goal, we make three assumptions on the term structure. First,
the term structure is monotonic, i.e. β2 = 0. In this case, a positive β1 results in a decreasing
yield curve and a negative β1 results in an increasing one. Second, the term structure approaches
zero in infinite future, or lim
m→∞
g(m; β0, β1, β2, τ) = β0 = 0. The intuition is that companies
are effectively risk neutral about the losses in infinite future and thus evaluate them at actuarial
value. Also intuitively from our theoretical results, a firms capitalization level would approach
optimality as firm always choose optimal level of exposure and external capital raising in the
infinite future, thus V1 will approach zero when time goes to infinity. Third, β1 depends on how
well the company is capitalized. More precisely, β1 = b0 + b1 · Xi, where Xi is a variable that
assesses the capitalization of a company. Along with our assumptions, we can write down the term
structure function as follows:
gi(m) = (b0 + b1Xi)
(
1− e−mτ
m
τ
)
,
and together with expected paid loss, we have the identification for valuation of total loss reserve:
ELi + b0
N∑
n=1
dn∑
m=1
(1 + r1)−1(1− e− 1τ1
τ
)
· Pn,i · f1 +
dn∑
m=2
(1 + rm)
−m
(
1− e−mτ
m
τ
)
· Pn,i · f1 · · · · · fm−1 · (fm − 1)

+b1Xi
N∑
n=1
dn∑
m=1
(1 + r1)−1(1− e− 1τ1
τ
)
· Pn,i · f1 +
dn∑
m=2
(1 + rm)
−m
(
1− e−mτ
m
τ
)
· Pn,i · f1 · · · · · fm−1 · (fm − 1)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
V ELi
V ELi means the valuation of loss reserve for company i. Now Equation 2.9 looks like:
Pi − αi = ELi + b0 · V ELi + b1 ·Xi × V ELi + c · SURPi,
where αi correspond to the addition amount over/under total premium on the left-hand side of
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2006 2011 2017
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Pi 454,120 2,448,032 421,235 2,454,344 577,997 3,340,674
ELi 205,130 1,180,483 184,314 1,177,542 250,948 1,532,206
EPi 248,990 1,291,260 236,921 1,301,678 327,049 1,842,551
SURPi 473,793 2,866,170 580,728 4,112,805 758,166 5,790,749
SAi 0.4450 0.1988 0.4638 0.1958 0.4763 0.1890
No. Obs. 895 955 900
Table 2.3: Summary statistics
Equation 2.9. We write αi = α + i, with E[i] = 0. We define EPi = Pi − ELi as excess
premium over expected losses. Rearrange the equation above, we propose the following model for
estimation:
EPi = α + b0 · V ELi + b1 ·Xi × V ELi + c · SURPi + i (2.10)
The estimation of the model takes two steps. We notice that there is a hidden parameter τ .
We follow the empirical approach in Nelson and Siegel (1987) and first find a grid of τ values.
Conditional on τ , the model essentially becomes a linear model and can be estimated using OLS
approach. We analyze the model for each τ on a grid and find the “best” fit with the least residual
standard deviation.
We use data obtained from combined NAIC5 annual statements of P&C insurance companies at
group level in the U.S. and across multiple years. From each company, we can obtain net premium
written and paid loss triangles (Schedule P part 3) for each business line. We have two candidates
for Xi: surplus to asset ratio SAi and logged leverage ratio LRi = log
(
1− SAi
SAi
)
. We obtain
SURPi, SAi and LRi for year 2006, 2011 and 2017. We use 10 years of triangle to compute ELi
and V ELi. For example, we obtain triangles from year 1996–2005 to estimate chain-ladder factors
for expected losses in year 2006.
The estimation results are listed in Table 2.4. We use τ values from 0.1 to 2 with 0.01 incre-
ment and τ ∗ is one that results in the least residual standard error. For both candidates of Xi, the
estimated unit capital cost c is about the same, with about 8% in 2006, 13% in 2011, and 7.5% in
5The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is the U.S. standard-setting and regulatory support organization
created and governed by the chief insurance regulators from the 50 states, the District of Columbia and five U.S. territories.
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Figure 2.12: Term structure of loss reserves for representative company with normal capitalization
Figure 2.13: Term structure of loss reserves for representative company with high capitalization
2017. The estimate for b0 and b1 are all significant. Our estimation is robust to additional regressors
as shown in Table 2.5.
We can use the estimates to back out term structure function gi(m). Figure 2.12 and 2.13
shows the term structure in three years for two different companies. The first company has lower
capitalization level than the second one. In year 2006 and 2017, both companies has downward
sloping term structure, but Company 1 price future expected losses at a much higher level. In year
2011, Company 2 has a upward sloping curve, which is not usually seen and only happens when the
company has a very high level of capitalization. Company 2 price the future losses below actuarial
value and the premium mostly recoup the high capital costs. Again, the empirical findings are in
line with our theoretical results presented in Section 2.2.5.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we set out to explore how a financial institution evaluates its future cash flows as
a term structure of capital costs in a P&C insurance company setting. We find both theoretical
and empirical implication that a well-capitalized insurer discount its future claim payments into
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2006 2011 2017
Xi = SAi LRi SAi LRi SAi LRi
(Intercept) 32558.96 32382.95 17498.88 17783.77 25307.95 25612.60
(5897.93) (5969.82) (4499.02) (4524.51) (5271.12) (5295.69)
V ELi 5.1050 1.8723 23.1275 5.7211 2.0026 1.1889
(0.1010) (0.0345) (0.3170) (0.1792) (0.0345) (0.0219)
Xi V ELi -5.5629 0.8747 -35.1023 7.9418 -1.5588 0.3395
(0.2373) (0.0399) (0.6866) (0.1566) (0.0850) (0.0192)
SURPi 0.0829 0.0783 0.1297 0.1297 0.0758 0.0753
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0026) (0.0026)
τ∗ 0.37 0.52 0.10 0.10 1.69 1.86
R2 0.9753 0.9747 0.9839 0.9837 0.9799 0.9797
Residual std. err. 172871 174963 134988 135766 153920 154662
No. Observation 895 895 955 955 900 900
Table 2.4: Regression results
2006 2011 2017
Original Robustness Original Robustness Original Robustness
(Intercept) 32558.96 -150131.8 17498.88 -114796.80 25307.95 -167300.30
(5897.93) (28491.26) (4499.02) (24427.16) (5271.12) (28274.30)
V ELi 5.1050 4.8677 23.1275 23.2212 2.0026 1.9356
(0.1010) (0.1063) (0.3170 ) (0.3779) (0.0345) (0.0412)
SAi V ELi -5.5629 -4.7650 -35.1023 -34.9597 -1.5588 -1.4460
(0.2373) (0.3019) (0.6866) (1.0240) (0.0850) (0.1321)
SURPi 0.0829 0.0303 0.1297 0.1286 0.0758 0.0804
(0.0045) (0.0151) (0.0065) (0.0142) (0.0026) (0.0074)
log(ASSET ) - 16593.96 - 12172.29 - 17289.7800
(2601.42) (2226.08) (2496.99)
Policyholder Dividend - 3.1151 - 0.1935 - -0.1940
(0.3111) (0.3654) (0.2959)
Investment Income - 0.3120 - -0.1276 - 0.0910
(0.0958) (0.0139) (0.0923)
R2 0.9753 0.9792 0.9839 0.9844 0.9799 0.9809
Residual std. err. 172871 158900 134988 133000 153920 150400
No. Observation 895 895 955 955 900 900
Table 2.5: Regression results with robustness
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premium and has a upward sloping term structure, while other insurers with lower capitalization
level mark up their future claim payments and have a downward sloping term structure.
The model presented in this chapter takes into account the loss structure of a P&C insurance
company, which is a novel feature relative to the previous literature. The general model is very
flexible and can be applied to insurance companies that have both short-tailed and long-tailed
business lines. The implementation of the model with two lines and two development years shows
previous loss exposure and loss realization significantly affect the company’s optimal policies.
We find that long-tailed lines are employed as short-term sources of financing, an insight that
considerably changes the characteristics and optimal policies relative to short-tailed lines.
Various extensions are possible. First, for tractability, we adopt a chain-ladder method with
normal distributions. In the actuarial literature, there are more advanced models for estimating and
forecasting loss triangles that may be considered. Second, we begin with the assumption that all
the assets are invested at a fixed interest rate. Adding securities markets to the general model as
well as other financing options or reinsurance would further bridge the gap between model and
reality.
2.5 Appendix A: Technical Appendix
2.5.1 Proofs of the Lemmas and Propositions
Lemma 2.1 The optimization problem (2.4) can be equivalently represented as a maximization of
the present value of future dividends:
max
ct
E
[∑
t≤t∗
−βt−1B(t) − a(0)
]
,
where t∗ is the time such that a(1) ≥ 0, a(2) ≥ 0, . . . , a(t∗−1) ≥ 0, a(t∗) < 0.
Proof. The capital motion equation (2.1) can be rewritten into:
βta(t) − βt−1a(t−1) − βt−1B(t) = βt [(1 + r)p(,t) − I(,t) − (1 + r)(τa(t−1) + c(B(t)))]
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We can rewrite the objective function in (2.4) as the following:
∞∑
t=1
E
[
1{a(1)≥0,...,a(t)≥0}βt{(1 + r)p(,t) − I(,t) − βt(1 + r)(τa(t−1) + c(B(t)))}
− 1{a(1)≥0,...,a(t)<0}(1 + r)(a(t−1) +B(t))
]
.
= E
[∑
t<t∗
βta(t) − βt−1a(t−1) − βt−1B(t) − βt∗−1(a(t∗−1) +B(t∗))
]
= E
[∑
t≤t∗
−βt−1B(t) + βt∗−1a(t∗−1) − a(0) − βt∗−1a(t∗−1)
]
=
∑
t≤t∗
E
[−βt−1B(t) − a(0)]
Proposition 2.1 (Bellman Equation). The Bellman equation for problem (2.4) reads:
V (a(t−1),Q(:,t−1),∆(:,t−1))
= max
q(:,t),p(:,t),B(t)
E
[
1{I(,t)≤S(t)}
(
p(,t) − βI(,t) − τa(t−1) − c(B(t)) + βV (a(t),Q(:,t),∆(:,t))
)
− 1{I(,t)>S(t)}(a(t−1) +B(t)) | ∆(:,t−1)
]
,
subject to (2.1), (2.2), (2.6)
Proof. Since our objective function in (2.4) is bounded from above, following Bertsekas (1995),
the infinite horizon optimization problem (2.4) subject to (2.1) is exactly resulting in the Bellman
equation (1).
Proposition 2.2 (Term Structure Equation). We have the marginal cost of risks presented in the
form of term structure of reserve and capital costs:
E
[
dn∑
j=1
βjL
(n,t+j−1)
j | ∆(:,t−1)
]
∗ pi(n)
(
1 +
N∑
i=1
pi
(i)
2
pi(n)
E
[
R(i,t) | ∆(:,t−1)
])
=
dn∑
s=0
βs+1 E
[
1{I(,t)≤S(t),...,I∗(,t+s)≤S∗(t+s)}L
(n,t+s)
s+1
(
1 + V1(a
∗(t+s),Q∗(:,t+s),∆(:,t+s))
)
(1− c′(B(t))) | ∆(:,t−1:t+s−1)
]
+ β
∂ρ(I(,t))
∂q(n,t)
(
N∑
i=1
E
[
R(i,t) | ∆(:,t−1)
]
∗ pi(i)1
∂φ
∂S(t)
)
(2.11)
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Proof. The Bellman equation reads:
V (a(t−1),Q(:,t−1),∆(:,t−1))
= max
q(:,t),p(:,t),B(t)
E
[
1{I(,t)≤S(t)}
(
p(,t) − βI(,t) − τa(t−1) − c(B(t)) + βV (a(t),Q(:,t),∆(:,t))
)
− 1{I(,t)>S(t)}(a(t−1) +B(t)) | ∆(:,t−1)
]
,
where,
I(,t) =
N∑
n=1
(q(n,t) ∗ L(n,t)1 +Q(n,t−1) ∗ L(n,t))
S(t) =
(
a(t−1)(1− τ) +B(t) − c(B(t)) + p(,t)
)
(1 + r)
R(n,t) =
dn∑
j=1
βj−1q(n,t)L(n,t+j−1)j
subject to:
a(t) = S(t) − I(,t)
p(n,t) = E
[
βR(n,t) | ∆(:,t−1)
]
∗ pi(n)(φ, θ), n = 1, 2, . . . , N
The premium function is the product of conditional expected present value of R(n,t), or future
losses of the accident year t, and a markup function pi(n). The markup function consists of two
arguments: a risk metric φ and company size. We assume the risk metric is scale invariant, or
φ(wI(,t), wS(t)) = φ(I(,t), S(t)), w > 0. Denote ∂pi
(n)(x,y)
∂x
= pi
(n)
1 and
∂pi(n)(x,y)
∂y
= pi
(n)
2 .
In addition, we denote the gradients of the value function
V1(a,Q
(:),∆(:)) = lim
δ→0
V (a+ δ,Q(:),∆(:))− V (a,Q(:),∆(:))
δ
For s = 1, 2, . . . , dn − 1
V
(n)
2,s (a,Q
(:),∆(:)) = lim
δ→0
V (a,Q(1:n−1),
sth element in Q(n)︷ ︸︸ ︷
. . . , q(n) + δ, . . . ,Q(n+1:N),∆(:))− V (a,Q(1:n−1),
sth element in Q(n)︷ ︸︸ ︷
. . . , q(n) , . . .,Q(n+1:N),∆(:))
δ
The Lagrangian writes:
L(t) = E
[
1{I(,t)≤S(t)}
(
p(,t) − βI(,t) − τa(t−1) − c(B(t)) + βV (a(t),Q(:,t),∆(:,t))
)
− 1{I(,t)>S(t)}(a(t−1) +B(t)) | ∆(:,t−1)
]
−
N∑
i=1
λ(i,t)
(
p(i,t) − E
[
βR(i,t) | ∆(:,t−1)
]
∗ pi(i)(φ, θ)
)
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Take first order conditions:
∂L(t)
∂q(n,t)
= E
[
1{I(,t)≤S(t)}
(
−βL(n,t)1 + β
(
−L(n,t)1 V1(a(t),Q(:,t),∆(:,t)) + V (n)2,1 (a(t),Q(:,t),∆(:,t))
))
| ∆(:,t−1)
]
+ λ(n,t)
(
E
[
dn∑
j=1
βjL
(n,t+j−1)
j | ∆(:,t−1)
]
∗ pi(n)
(
φ(I(,t), S(t)),Et−1
[
R(,t) | ∆(:,t−1)
]))
+
N∑
i=1
λ(i,t)E
[
βR(i,t) | ∆(:,t−1)
]
∗
(
pi
(i)
1
∂φ
∂q(n,t)
+ pi
(i)
2 E
[
dn∑
j=1
βjL
(n,t+j−1)
j | ∆(:,t−1)
])
= 0 (2.12)
∂L(t)
∂p(n,t)
= E
[
1{I(,t)≤S(t)}
(
1 + V1(a
(t),Q(:,t),∆(:,t))
)
| ∆(:,t−1)
]
− λ(n,t) +
N∑
i=1
λ(i,t)E
[
βR(i,t) | ∆(:,t−1)
]
∗ pi(i)1
∂φ
∂p(n,t)
= 0 (2.13)
∂L(t)
∂B(t)
= E
[
1{I(,t)≤S(t)}
(
−c′(B(t)) + (1− c′(B(t))) V1(a(t),Q(:,t),∆(:,t))
)
− 1{I(,t)>S(t)} | ∆(:,t−1)
]
+
N∑
i=1
λ(i,t)E
[
βR(i,t) | ∆(:,t−1)
]
∗ pi(i)1
∂φ
∂B(t)
= 0 (2.14)
The envelope theorem suggests that
V
(n)
2,1 (a
(t),Q(:,t),∆(:,t))
= −β E
[
1{I∗(,t+1)≤S∗(t+1)}L
(n,t+1)
2
(
1 + V1(a
∗(t+1),Q∗(:,t+1),∆(:,t+1))
)
+ V
(n)
2,2 (S
∗(,t+1) − I∗(t+1), q∗(:,t+1), q(:,t), . . . , q(:,t−dn+2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q∗(:,t+1)
,∆(:,t+1)) | ∆(:,t)

V
(n)
2,2 (a
(t+1),Q(:,t+1),∆(:,t+1))
= −β E
[
1{I∗(,t+2)≤S∗(t+2)}L
(n,t+2)
3
(
1 + V1(a
∗(t+2),Q∗(:,t+2),∆(:,t+2))
)
+ V
(n)
2,3 (S
∗(,t+2) − I∗(t+2), q∗(:,t+2), q(:,t+1), . . . , q(:,t−dn+3),∆(:,t+2)) | ∆(:,t+1)
]
.
.
.
V
(n)
2,dn−1(a
(t+dn−2),Q(:,t+dn−2),∆(:,t+dn−2))
= −β E
[
1{I∗(,t+dn−1)≤S∗(t+dn−1)}L
(n,t+dn−1)
dn
(
1 + V1(a
∗(t+dn−1),Q∗(:,t+dn−1),∆(:,t+dn−1))
)
+ V
(n)
2,dn
(S∗(,t+dn−1) − I∗(t+dn−1), q∗(:,t+dn−1), q(:,t+dn−2), . . . , q(:,t),∆(:,t+dn−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
| ∆(:,t+dn−2)

(2.15)
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In the end, we have
V
(n)
2,1 (a
(t),Q(:,t),∆(:,t))
= −β E
[
1{I∗(,t+1)≤S∗(t+1)}L
(n,t+1)
2
(
1 + V1(a
∗(t+1),Q∗(:,t+1),∆(:,t+1))
)
| ∆(:,t)
]
−β2 E
[
1{I∗(,t+1)≤S∗(t+1) & I∗(,t+2)≤S∗(t+2)}L
(n,t+2)
3
(
1 + V1(a
∗(t+2),Q∗(:,t+2),∆(:,t+2))
)
| ∆(:,t),∆(:,t+1)
]
. . .
−βdn−1 E
[
1{I∗(,t+1)≤S∗(t+1),...,I∗(,t+dn−1)≤S∗(t+dn−1)}L
(n,t+dn−1)
dn
×
(
1 + V1(a
∗(t+dn−1),Q∗(:,t+dn−1),∆(:,t+dn−1))
)
| ∆(:,t+dn−2), . . . ,∆(:,t)
]
= −
dn−1∑
s=1
βs E
[
1{I∗(,t+1)≤S∗(t+1),...,I∗(,t+s)≤S∗(t+s)}L
(n,t+s)
s+1
(
1 + V1(a
∗(t+s),Q∗(:,t+s),∆(:,t+s))
)
| ∆(:,t:t+s−1)
]
(2.16)
Now, since
∂φ
∂B(t)
=
∂φ
∂S(t)
∂S(t)
∂B(t)
= (1 + r)(1− c′(B(t))) ∂φ
∂S(t)
= (1− c′(B(t))) ∂φ
∂S(t)
∂S(t)
∂p(n,t)
= (1− c′(B(t))) ∂φ
∂p(n,t)
From equations (2.13) and (2.14), we have
λ(n,t) =
1
1− c′(B(t)) , ∀n = 1, 2, . . . , N, t = 1, 2, . . .
and
N∑
i=1
1
1− c′(B(t))E
[
R(i,t) | ∆(:,t−1)
]
∗ pi(i)1
∂φ
∂S(t)
=
1
1− c′(B(t)) − E
[
1{I(,t)≤S(t)}(1 + V1(a
(t),Q(:,t),∆(:,t))) | ∆(:,t−1)
]
(2.17)
The scale invariance property of φ yields the following (cf. Bauer and Zanjani, 2018):
0 =
∂
∂w
φ(wI(,t), wS(t)) = S(t)
∂
∂S(t)
φ(wI(,t), wS(t)) + I(,t)
∂
∂I(,t)
φ(wI(,t), wS(t))
⇒ S(t) =
N∑
i=1
dn−1∑
j=0
q(i,t−j)
∂
∂q(i,t−j) φ(I
(,t), S(t))
− ∂
∂S(t)
φ(I(,t), S(t))
(2.18)
Define ρ as the risk measure associated with the risk metric φ, with adding-up property:
N∑
i=1
dn−1∑
j=0
q(i,t−j)
∂ρ(I(,t))
∂q(i,t−j)
=
N∑
i=1
dn−1∑
j=0
q(i,t−j)
∂
∂q(i,t−j) φ(I
(,t), S(t))
− ∂
∂S(t)
φ(I(,t), S(t))
= S(t)
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Hence for every i, j and t, we have:
∂φ
∂q(i,t−j)
= − ∂φ
∂S(t)
∗ ∂ρ(I
(,t))
∂q(i,t−j)
(2.19)
With equations (2.16), (2.17) and (2.19), (2.12) becomes:
∂L(t)
∂q(n,t)
= −β E
[
1{I(,t)≤S(t)}
(
L
(n,t)
1 (1 + V1(a
(t),Q(:,t),∆(:,t)))
)
| ∆(:,t−1)
]
−
dn−1∑
s=1
βs+1 E
[
1{I(,t)≤S(t),...,I∗(,t+s)≤S∗(t+s)}L
(n,t+s)
s+1
(
1 + V1(a
∗(t+s),Q∗(:,t+s),∆(:,t+s))
)
| ∆(:,t−1)
]
+
1
(1− c′(B(t)))E
[
dn∑
j=1
βjL
(n,t+j−1)
j | ∆(:,t−1)
]
∗
(
pi(n) +
N∑
i=1
pi
(i)
2 E
[
R(i,t) | ∆(:,t−1)
])
− β ∂ρ(I
(,t))
∂q(n,t)
(
N∑
i=1
1
1− c′(B(t))E
[
R(i,t) | ∆(:,t−1)
]
∗ pi(i)1
∂φ
∂S(t)
)
= 0
Rearrange and obtain the term structure equation (2.7).
2.5.2 2L2DY Loss Distribution Assumptions
In loss triangle depicted by Figure 2.3, L(n)1 are losses paid in the previous accident year t−1. L(1)1 is
a realization included in the Markov structure, and therefore is a state variable in the optimal control
problem, Line 2 has no development year, so L(2)1 is irrelevant in the optimal control problem.
L
′(1)
1 , L
′(2)
1 , and L
(1)
2 are the losses to be paid in the current period t, with L
′(1)
1 and L
′(2)
1 being paid
losses for accident year t and L(1)2 being the second development year paid loss for the previous
accident year t − 1 of line 1. Therefore, L′(1)1 , L
′(2)
1 , and L
(1)
2 are the stochastic disturbances and
have distributions subject to probability measures p(dL
′(1)
1 |L(1)1 ), p(dL
′(2)
1 |L(2)1 ) and p(dL(1)2 |L(1)1 ).
Meanwhile, L
′(1)
2 is the paid loss in the next period t + 1, developed from L
′(1)
1 and therefore
related to the current period’s premium in Line 1, L
′(1)
2 is also the stochastic disturbance subject to
probability measures p(dL
′(1)
2 |L
′(1)
1 ). We make the following assumptions for the properties of the
probability measures:
Following Chain-Ladder, we assume:
E(L(1)2 |L(1)1 ) = (f − 1)L(1)1 , E(L
′(1)
2 |L
′(1)
1 ) = (f − 1)L
′(1)
1 ,
V(L(1)2 |L(1)1 ) = σ2L(1)1 , V(L
′(1)
2 |L
′(1)
1 ) = σ
2L
′(1)
1 .
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We assume conditional normality:
L
′(n)
1 |L(n)1 = L
′(n)
1 ∼ N (µ(n)1 , (σ(n)1 )2) n = 1, 2,
L
(1)
2 |L(1)1 ∼ N ((f − 1)L(1)1 , σ2L(1)1 ),
L
′(1)
2 |L
′(1)
1 ∼ N ((f − 1)L
′(1)
1 , σ
2L
′(1)
1 ).
We assume a linear correlation between lines:
corr(L
(1)
1 , L
(2)
1 ) = corr(L
′(1)
1 , L
′(2)
1 ) = ρ.
The chain-ladder property follows Mack (1993), whose model assumes M (n)t,j−1 = C
(n)
t,j−1. That
is, the cumulative paid loss in each accident year is a Markov chain, with the ultimate development
year being the time horizon of the chain. f and σ2 are respectively the chain-ladder factor and its
variance factor.
As is conventional in this context, the indemnity is assumed to be proportional to the current-
period exposures q′(n) and last-period exposures q(n). Hence, the indemnity random variable is
specified as I = q′(1)L
′(1)
1 + q
′(2)L
′(2)
1 + q
(1)L
(1)
2 . This linearity assumption entails that the marginal
claim distribution is fixed, so that the loss distribution is homogeneous. In addition to linearity
of indemnity, the conditional normality assumption ensures that I is also normal, with conditional
mean and variance:
µI = E(I|L(1)1 ) = q
′(1)µ
(1)
1 + q
′(2)µ
(2)
1 + (f − 1)q(1)L(1)1 ,
σ2I = V(I|L(1)1 ) = (q
′(1))2(σ
(1)
1 )
2 + (q
′(2))2(σ
(2)
1 )
2 + (q(1))2σ2L
(1)
1 + 2q
′(1)q
′(2)ρσ
(1)
1 σ
(2)
1 .
Again, this is in line with typical assumptions, and generalizations are possible.
2.5.3 Numerical Solution of 2L2DY Model
To solve the Bellman equation, we rely on numerical methods. By our premium function assump-
tion, q′(1) , q′(2), and B endogenously determine the sum of premiums P , and therefore these are
the only choice variables. Note that the expectations of Equation (2.8) entail functions of L
′(1)
1
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and I , which renders the problem two-dimensional. To solve it, we use the numerical integration
method from Tanskanen and Lukkarinen (2003).
First, let X = L
′(1)
1 and Y = I|L(1)1 . Note that X and Y , both univariate normal, can be
represented as a bivariate normal distribution:
(
X
Y
)
∼ N
( µ(1)1
µI
)
,
 (σ(1)1 )2 ρx,y σ(1)1 σI
ρx,y σ
(1)
1 σI σ
2
I
 ,
where ρx,y =
q
′(1)σ(1)1 +q
′(2)ρσ(2)1
σI
. Hence, the conditional distribution of Y given X is also univariate
normal with mean and variance
µy|x = µI + ρx,yσI
x− µ(1)1
σ
(1)
1
,
σ2y|x = σ
2
I (1− ρ2x,y), (2.20)
respectively.
Let f(x, y) be the density of the bivariate normal ofX and Y , f(y|x) be the conditional density
of Y given X , and f(x) be the marginal density of X . Because of the nature of the value function
is unknown, we need to use the value iteration method to solve the Bellman equation (2.8) on a
discretized state-space. For 2L2DY model, there are three state variables: capital a, last-period
exposures on long-tailed line 1 q(1), and last-period loss realizations on long-tailed line 1 L(1)1 .
Here are the steps of solving the Bellman equation using value iteration.
(1) Pick grids for a = (a1, a2, . . . , as), q(1) = (q1, q2, . . . , qn), and L
(1)
1 = (x1, x2, . . . , xp). Set
V0 = v0(a, q
(1), L
(1)
1 ), where v0 is an arbitrary function.
(2) Solve the optimization problem on the right hand side of the Bellman equation and get
optimized state variables c∗ and yield policy function c = u1((a, q(1), L
(1)
1 ); c
∗). Then obtain the
next value function V1((a, q(1), L
(1)
1 );u1)...until Vj converges.
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We can obtain a simplified Bellman equation for implementation:
βE
{
1{I≤S}S − I
}
=
∫ S
−∞
β(S − y)f(y) dy
= βSΦI(S)− β
∫ S
−∞
y
1√
2piσI
e
− (y−µI )
2
2σ2
I dy
= β ((S − µI) ΦI(S) + σI φI(S))
And
E
{
1{I≤S}V (a′, L
′(1)
1 )
}
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ S
−∞
V (a′, q
′(1), x)f(x, y) dy dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(∫ S
−∞
V (a′, q
′(1), x)f(y|x) dy
)
f(x) dx,
(2.21)
where Φ and φ, respectively, are the CDF and PDF of a standard normal distribution.
To solve the inner integral on a grid, we apply the Tanskanen and Lukkarinen (2003) method.
First, we interpolate on a. We pick (l+1)-point grids for I ≥ 0, say (y0, y1, . . . , yl), with 0 = y0 <
y1 < · · · < yl = S, let ϕi = V (a′(yi), q′(1), L
′(1)
1 ).
For a′(yi) ∈ (ak, ak+1), we approximately have by linear interpolation:
ϕi =
ak+1 − a′(yi)
ak+1 − ak V (ak, q
′(1), L
′(1)
1 ) +
a′(yi)− ak
ak+1 − ak V (ak+1, q
′(1), L
′(1)
1 )
If a′(yi) > al, we can extrapolate:
ϕi =
a′(yi)− al−1
al − al−1 V (al, q
′(1), L
′(1)
1 ) +
a′(yi)− al
al − al−1 V (al−1, q
′(1), L
′(1)
1 )
The linear interpolation w.r.t. Y is
V (a′, q
′(1), L
′(1)
1 ) =
l−1∑
k=0
(
ϕk +
y − yk
yk+1 − yk
(
ϕk+1 − ϕk
))
1[yk,yk+1)(y)
75
We then break down the integral into sums:
∫ S
−∞
V (a′, q
′(1), x)f(y|x) dy
=
l−1∑
k=0
[(
ϕk − yk(ϕk+1 − ϕk)
yk+1 − yk
)∫ yk+1
yk
f(y|x)dy +
(
ϕk+1 − ϕk
yk+1 − yk
)∫ yk+1
yk
yf(y|x)dy
]
=
l−1∑
k=0
{(
ϕk − yk(ϕk+1 − ϕk)
yk+1 − yk
)[
Φ
(
yk+1 − µy|x
σy|x
)
− Φ
(
yk − µy|x
σy|x
)]
+
(
ϕk+1 − ϕk
yk+1 − yk
)[
µy|x
(
Φ
(
yk+1 − µy|x
σy|x
)
− Φ
(
yk − µy|x
σy|x
))
−σy|x
(
φ
(
yk+1 − µy|x
σy|x
)
− φ
(
yk − µy|x
σy|x
))]}
= h(x) (2.22)
Therefore the right-hand side of our Bellman equation can be written as
β
(
(S − µI) Φ
(
S − µI
σI
)
+ σI φ
(
S − µI
σI
))
+
∫ ∞
−∞
βh(x)f(x)dx− a−B, (**)
which can be solved using a discretized grid of L
′(1)
1 .
For our interpolation, we choose am+1-point equally spaced grid on [µ(1)1 −5σ(1)1 , µ(1)1 +5σ(1)1 ],
say (x0, x1, . . . , xm). In our case the grid size is 26. Use the trapezoidal rule to break the integral
down into sums, say F (x) = β(g(x) + h(x))f(x), then the integral becomes:
∫ ∞
−∞
F (x) dx =
xm − x0
2m
(F (x0) + 2F (x1) + · · ·+ 2F (xm−1) + F (xm))
Hence we successfully convert double integrals into sums and therefore significantly reduce the
computation time without compromising the accuracy. The value iteration is implemented and run
in Julia. The optimization is executed using Julia’s NLopt package. The value function is defined
on a 21 x 21 x 3 discretized grid (with 21 grid points on a and q′(1)). We ran the program for 80
iterations and the value function converges for both value function and choice variables.
The total runtime was about 100,000s, on a Intel I7 dual-core CPU. In this specific numerical
task, Julia is six times faster than the popular high-level language such as R and MatLab. In
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particular, Julia is much faster with loops, which is heavily found in the iterations and numerical
integrals. According to Julia language developers, Julia is a high-performance language suitable
for dynamic programming and its syntax is easily adapted from R or Matlab. Julia’s high efficiency
helps shorten the runtime from one week that would have taken on R, to just under one day.
Compared to previous models without considering DY, which only has one state variable cap-
ital, the 2L2DY model suffers from “the curse of dimensionality”. As the general nLjDY model
has hundreds, million, or even trillion times more states, each iteration of value function would
take proportional more time to complete, resulting the value iteration to finish in months or even
years. Solving this high-dimensional problem seems infeasible even five years ago, but thanks to
the power of modern day computing, it is feasible under proper assumptions. We start with solving
2L2DY, which has the least dimension in the general nLjDY model. In the future, we will continue
to refine the algorithm and implement parallel computing to further shorten the running time.
2.6 Appendix B: Additional Figures
(a) Function of a (b) Function of q(1)
Figure 2.14: 2-dimensional representations of external capital raising (small previous shock)
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(a) Function of a (b) Function of q(1)
Figure 2.15: 2-dimensional representations of external capital raising (large previous shock)
Figure 2.16: Convergence of value function and choice variables
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Chapter 3
Different Shades of Risk: Mortality Trends
Implied by Term Insurance Prices1
3.1 Introduction
Term life insurance policies are typically considered to be fairly homogeneous products. Aside
from conversion options and financial strength ratings—the relevance of which is mitigated to some
extent by guaranty funds protection—the ensuing cash flows are typically relative congenerous
across issuers. The key risk factors are investment/interest and mortality risks, where in view
of the former investment opportunities and strategies again do not vary much across companies.
Thus, given competitive forces in this large and undifferentiated market, it seems proximate to
infer forward-looking, market-based estimates of future mortality dynamics from insurance prices
(Mullin and Philipson, 1997).
Building on this logic, we estimate the stochastic mortality model from Bauer and Kramer
(2016) with a set of US (term) life insurance prices using a generalized method of moments (GMM)
approach, where we allow for selection/underwriting effects, surrenders, pertinent expenses, etc.
1This essay is co-authored with Daniel Bauer and is forthcoming at the North American Actuarial Journal. A previous version
was presented at the Twelfth International Longevity Risk and Capital Markets Solutions Conference (Longevity 12) under the title
“Mortality Trends Implied by Term Insurance Prices”, and parts are taken from the earlier working paper “The Risk in Catastrophe
Mortality Securitization Transactions” by the second author. We are grateful for helpful comments from an anonymous referee,
Jin-Chuan Duan, Yue Kuen Kwok, Johnny Li, and other participants of the Insurance Risk and Finance Research Centre (IRFRC)
2017 Annual Conference, the Longevity 12 conference, Perspectives on Actuarial Risks in Talks of Young Researchers, and for
financial support under the Society of Actuaries CAE grant “New Trends in Longevity”.
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The model includes a catastrophe component to pick up mortality shocks associated with pan-
demics or natural disasters, a fairly flexible mortality trend component, and a diffusion term to
capture stochastic variations in the mortality trend. Our results are striking: Neither the catas-
trophe component nor the diffusion term is significant, and a model comparison favors a simple
deterministic mortality model. In contrast, allowing for heterogeneity among the carriers is of ut-
most importance: A model that does not incorporate differences in mortality trends between the
different companies is strongly rejected. The company effects are large in magnitude and point
towards three possible sub-markets.
Our interpretation is that for pricing and managing term life insurance products—potentially
in contrast to annuity and pension products (cf. Sec. 3.3.4)—the key risks emanate from the com-
position of the pool of policyholders, rather than the uncertainty in aggregate mortality trends.
Differences in underwriting criteria, primary distribution channels and distribution area, and other
factors jointly determine the composition of the insurer’s portfolio of policies in each rating class.
The relevant mortality rates for a given company will be based on the demographic evolution of this
subgroup, and their behavior with regards to lapsing their contracts. Given heterogeneity in mortal-
ity trends for different population subgroups and different causes of death, the cross-sectional risk
dimension dwarfs uncertainties in the aggregate trend. In other words, basis risk, i.e. the deviation
of the experience in the particular pool relative to the aggregate population, seems to dominate sys-
tematic mortality risk, i.e. uncertainties in the aggregate trend component. And, indeed, an active
management of the composition of the pool, by accepting certain risks and rejecting others, may
be a way to compete in the marketplace.
Our findings have consequences for mortality risk management and for the corresponding ac-
tuarial literature. On the one side, they do not support assertions that aggregate mortality risks are
important for life insurance products. For instance, papers presenting “natural hedging” between
life insurance and annuity lines as an internal way to manage a company’s mortality exposure
implicitly assume that the corresponding populations of policyholders are subject to the same vari-
ations. Thus, our results cast doubt on the effectiveness of such strategies, pointing to the necessity
of market-based solutions for managing longevity. On the other side, our conclusion that mortality
trends for different partitions of the population and different conditions determine the mortality
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profile of the relevant portfolio of policyholders, and that it may be possible to actively manage
this profile, emphasizes the importance of studying mortality at a more granular level.
Related Literature and Organization of the Essay
A closely related paper to ours is Mullin and Philipson (1997), who argue that under the assump-
tion that insurance companies are close to risk-neutral with respect to their mortality exposure,
it is possible to derive market-based estimates from zero expected profit (moment) conditions.
In contrast to Mullin and Philipson, however, we include additional institutional factors affecting
life insurance prices such as expenses, selection/underwriting effects, and policy surrenders/lapses.
Furthermore, we consider variations in mortality in the time and the cross-sectional (across compa-
nies) direction. The latter aspect, in particular, allows us to draw our primary conclusions. Several
papers in the actuarial literature also rely on prices of insurance products to obtain parameters in
mortality models. In particular, Lin and Cox (2005) and Bauer et al. (2010) use annuity quotes to
estimate risk premiums for longevity risk.
In the estimation process, we use the stochastic mortality model from Bauer and Kramer (2016).
As discussed in their paper, the model is flexible enough to fit a relatively long time series of US
mortality data, it includes a mortality catastrophe component, and it is tractable. The latter property
originates from it falling in the class of affine mortality models (Biffis, 2005; Dahl and Møller,
2006). In particular, this allows for an efficient computation of survival probabilities and, thus,
basic life insurance prices, which is essential for our estimation approach.
Our results relate to recent results in the economic and medical literature on the heterogeneity
of mortality trends across different subpopulations that show that there are large disparities in life
expectancy between different racial, regional, and socio-economic groups (Case and Deaton, 2015;
Chetty et al., 2016). Furthermore, they relate and endorse analyses of cause-specific mortality rates,
and how these in aggregate affect the mortality of a certain population (Boumezoued et al., 2017;
Arnold and Sherris, 2016, and references therein). An insurer’s underwriting process, together
with its regional presence, its advertising strategy, etc., determines the composition of the portfolio
of policyholders, and it is the mortality dynamics of that group that are relevant for the insurer’s
future cash flows.
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As indicated, our findings are relevant for so-called “natural hedging” approaches to managing
longevity risk by trading off annuity and life insurance exposures (Cox and Lin, 2007; Li and
Haberman, 2015, and references therein). In particular, our results suggest that beyond difficulties
with natural hedging within the same population (Zhu and Bauer, 2014), basis risk may inhibit the
effectiveness of such strategies.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the affine mor-
tality model from Bauer and Kramer (2016) with some extensions to suit our setting. Section 3.3
introduces our GMM estimation method, presents results, their implications, and a discussion on
their robustness. Finally, Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Model
In what follows, we introduce the mortality model from Bauer and Kramer (2016), which we rely
on in the remainder of the text. As discussed in their paper, the model consists of three parts:
1) a catastrophe component, 2) an age-dependent affine mortality component, and 3) a temporary
component. In contrast to their analysis, we use the third part to include selection/underwriting
effects, rather than a temporary deterministic trend. Furthermore, we subsequently augment the
model by company, risk class, and calendar year effects that account for heterogeneity in mortality
trends.
As in Bauer and Kramer (2016), we introduce the stochastic force of mortality by relying on
conventional concepts from credit risk modeling (Lando, 1998). More precisely, given a stochastic
process X = (Xt)0≤t≤T and a positive, continuous function µ(·, ·), we define an individual’s time
of death as the first jump time of a Cox-process with intensity µ(x0 + t,Xt):
τx0 = inf
{
t :
∫ t
0
µ(x0 + s,Xs) ds ≥ E
}
, (3.1)
where E is a Exp(1)-distributed random variable and independent among individuals.
Considering only one single insured for now, let the filtrations G = (Gt)0≤t≤T ∗ and
H = (Ht)0≤t≤T ∗ be given as the augmentations of the filtrations generated by (Xt)0≤t≤T ∗ and
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(
1{τx0≤t}
)
0≤t≤T ∗ , respectively, and set Ft = Gt ∨Ht. From Equation (3.1), we can then derive the
(T − t)-year survival probability at time t for an xt = x0 + t year old individual as
T−tpxt(t) := E
[
1{τx0>T}
∣∣Gt, τx0 > t] = E [exp{−∫ T
t
µ (x0 + s,Xs) ds
}∣∣∣∣Gt, τx0 > t] ,
(3.2)
and, from results of Lando (1998),
E
[
1{τx0>T}
∣∣Ft] = 1{τx0>t} T−tpx0+t(t)
Following Bauer and Kramer (2016), we use the following model for the baseline stochastic
force of mortality:
µt(x0) = µ(x0 + t, Yt,Γt) = e
b (x0+t) Yt + Γt +Dt(x0), Y0 > 0, Γ0 ≥ 0. (3.3)
The catastrophe component follows the dynamics:
dΓt = −κΓt dt+ dJt, Γ0 ≥ 0,
where (Jt) is a compound Poisson process with intensity λ and Exp(ζ)-distributed jumps. And the
baseline component follows the dynamics:
dYt = α
((
Y0 − β(2)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
β(3)
e−β
(1) t + β(2) − Yt
)
dt+ σ
√
Yt dWt, Y0 > 0,
where (Wt)0≤t≤T ∗ is a one-dimensional Brownian motion and α, β
(1), β(2), and σ are positive
constants with α 6= β(1). Here β(2) +β(3) describes the trend level at time 0. We refer to their paper
for the motivation of the model in the context of demographic research.
We use the temporary component Dt(x0) to introduce selection effects acting to temporary
reduce mortality. Here the selection effect does not refer to the potential impact of adverse selection
on life insurance prices but the impact of underwriting during the early policy years.2 In particular,
2In insurance practice, actuaries rely on so-called “select-and-ultimate” tables to account for this type of selection, where the
“select” tables used in early policy years display lower mortality due to underwriting examinations.
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this is important for the evaluation of life insurance prices as here mandatory health examinations
lead to significant selection effects. Within our model, this can be captured via the temporary
component D by a roughly proportional structure akin to a proportional hazards model:
Dt(x0) = c−
(
c+ eb(x0+t) τ
)× γ
T¯
× (T¯ − t)+.
Note that the component is still deterministic and it is only roughly proportional since we use
an approximation of the relevant force of mortality based on the initial values. Moreover, this
specification ofD only relies on the four additional parameters (c, τ , γ, T¯ ) minding the complexity
of the estimation process. We obtain:
D¯t,T (x0) =
∫ T
t
Ds(x0) ds
= c (T − t)− cγ
T¯
[(
(T¯ − t)+)2 − ((T¯ − T )+)2]
−τ γ
T¯ b
[
(T¯ − T )+ exp{b(x0 + min{T, T¯ )}}− (T¯ − t)+ exp{b(x0 + min{t, T¯ )}}]
− τ γ
T¯ b2
[
exp
{
b(x0 + min{T, T¯})
}− exp{b(x0 + min{t, T¯})}] .
The (exponential-)affine structure enables us to write down an analytical representation of the
survival function (cf. Prop. 1 in Duffie et al. (2000)):
T−tpx0+t(t) = exp
{
u(T − t) + v(T − t)Yt − Γt
κ
(
1− e−κ(T−t))− λ(T − t)
ζκ+ 1
}
× exp
{
λζ
ζκ+ 1
log
[
1 +
1
ζκ
(
1− e−κ(T−t))]− D¯t,T (x0)} , (3.4)
where u and v satisfy the following Riccati ODEs:
v′(s) = −eb(x0+T−s) − α v(s) + 1
2
σ2 v2(s), v(0) = 0,
u′(s) = v(s)α
(
e−β
(1) (T−s) Y0 + (1− e−β(1) (T−s)) β(2)
)
, u(0) = 0. (3.5)
Here, µt(x0) and T−tpx0+t(t) represent the baseline force of mortality and survival function, re-
spectively.
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We introduce heterogeneity in mortality trends by assuming that the aggregate force of mor-
tality in each company’s portfolio is proportional to the baseline. Thus, the force of mortality for
company i can be written as:
µit(x0) = µt(x0)(1 + E
co
i ),
∑
i
Ecoi = 0, i = 1, 2, ..., I,
where Ecoi is the company effect. We further add a risk class effect E
rc
j and a calendar year effect
Eyearh to the model to account for variation within a company and across different calendar years:
µ
(i,j,h)
t (x0) = µt(x0)(1 + E
co
i + E
rc
j + E
year
h ),∑
i
Ecoi =
∑
j
Ercj =
∑
h
Eyearh = 0, E
co
i + E
rc
j + E
year
h > −1 ∀i, j, h
with risk class j ranging from 1 (highest mortality risk, e.g. regular class) to J (lowest mortality
risk, e.g. preferred plus class) and year h spanning all calendar years of insurance prices. The three
effect components do not relate to the industry baseline force of mortality.
Therefore, the survival probabilities for company i, risk class j in calendar year h take the form:
T−tp
(i,j,h)
x0+t (t) = T−tpx0+t(t)
(1+Ecoi +E
rc
j +E
year
h ).
Given risk class, calendar year, and company effect parameters, it remains to calculate the survival
probabilities (3.4) and actuarial present values by simply solving the ODEs from Equation (3.5).
The full analytical representation of the survival probabilities facilitates the estimation process.
3.3 Estimation with Insurance Price Data
3.3.1 Insurance Price GMM Estimator
We are given annual term insurance premiums P (i,j,h)x,n for age x, term n, risk class j ∈ 1, 2, ..., J ,
calendar year h ∈ 1, 2, ..., H, and a fixed benefit B payable upon death at the end of the year from
I companies, i.e. i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I}, which we take to be i.i.d. Denote by C the collection of all
available age-term combinations (x, n) and we have Nx,n such combinations. As is common in
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actuarial modeling and in contrast to Mullin and Philipson (1997), we consider various types of
expenses to be reflected in our insurance price data. In particular, we include initial expenses both
as a percentage of the first premium c(1)IP and as a fixed amount depending on the death benefit c
(2)
IP ,
as well as a fixed maintenance expense cM (Society of Actuaries, 2004).
We assume policyholders surrender at a fixed proportion q(l)u in policy year u, u ≥ 1, immedi-
ately before premiums become due. Thus, policies remain in force for k years with a probability
of:
kp
(τ)(i,j,h)
x0
(0) = kp
(i,j,h)
x0
(0)
∏
1≤u≤k
(1− q(l)u )︸ ︷︷ ︸
kp
(l)
x0
, k ≥ 1.
Upon surrendering at time k, policyholders may be entitled to so-called cash surrender values
(CSVs) kC
(i,j,h)
x,n , which are to be calculated according to the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners’ (NAIC) Standard Nonforfeiture Law for Life Insurance. This regulation essen-
tially entails the calculation of guaranteed reserve levels according to given interest rates, a given
mortality table, and given expense levels. For simplicity, we assume the cost parameters and sur-
render probabilities are the same across all companies.3
We start by writing down an insurance company’s loss function, or the negative profit function:
f(θ, P
(i,j,h)
x,n ) =∑n−1
k=0 p(0, k + 1)
[
kp
(l)
x
(
kp
(i,j,h)
x (0)− k+1p(i,j,h)x (0)
)
B + kp
(τ)(i,j,h)
x (0) p
(i,j,h)
x+k (0) q
(l)
k+1 k+1C
(i,j,h)
x,n
]
+c
(2)
IP + cM
∑n−1
k=0 p(0, k) kp
(τ)(i,j,h)
x (0)− P (i,j,h)x,n
(∑n−1
k=0 p(0, k) kp
(τ)(i,j,h)
x (0)− c(1)IP
)
,
(3.6)
where p(t, τ) denotes the time t price of a zero coupon bond with maturity t + τ . Of course,
equation (3.6) depends on the (risk-neutral) parameters of the mortality model as well as on the
parameters governing expenses, selection, and surrenders, which we stack in the parameter vector
θ. The key assumption is now that the so-called equivalence principle holds, i.e. that the expected
present value of future benefits (including expenses) equals the expected present value of future
premiums for all of the company’s policies for one mortality profile, that is, for one risk class in
one calendar year. Thus, the equivalence principle must hold for each i, j, and h combination.
3This assumption, again, is motivated by competitive pressures in the market. Large differences in costs should be competed
away unless they are linked to aspects relating to underlying heterogeneity.
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That is to say, for each company and each risk class in one calendar year, the expected profit (loss)
from selling insurance contracts is zero. Therefore, we can write down our moment conditions for
the GMM estimation as follows:
Ex,n
[
f(θ, P (i,j,h)x,n )
]
= 0, (x, n) ∈ C.
The efficient GMM estimator can be obtained using the so-called “two-step feasible GMM”
method, which yields efficient and consistent estimators. First, choose a weighting matrix W ,
where W is an I × J ×H dimensional square matrix. W can be any such matrix in the first step.
We choose W such that
W−1 = diag
{
σ2i,j,h, (i, j, h)
}
,
where σ2i,j,h = Varx,n
[
P
(i,j,h)
x,n
]
with corresponding sample version σˆ2i,j,h. We obtain a GMM esti-
mate θˆ1 by minimizing the following function of θ:
θˆ1 = arg min
θ
[
1
Nx,n
Nx,n∑
x,n
f(θ, P (i,j,h)x,n )
]′
(i,j,h)
W
[
1
Nx,n
Nx,n∑
x,n
f(θ, P (i,j,h)x,n )
]
(i,j,h)
. (3.7)
Then, we update the weighting matrix using θˆ1:
Wˆ (θˆ1)
−1 = diag
{
1
Nx,n
Nx,n∑
j=1
(
f(θˆ1, P
(i,j,h)
x,n )
)2
, (i, j, h)
}
(3.8)
and minimize function (3.7) using W = Wˆ (θˆ1) to obtain our estimate θˆ. We carry out both
minimizations numerically.
3.3.2 Data and Estimation
We use quotes for annual life insurance premiums from the CompuLife price quotation system
(historical data) for April 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015. More precisely, we focus on contracts with
a face amount of $500,000 for male non-smokers under two underwriting categories: regular (Rg,
residual standard), and preferred plus (Pf+, super preferred). From 31 companies, we retrieved
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data for 33 age-term combinations, with terms of 10, 15, 20, and 30 years, and ages from 25 to
75, where for numerical convenience we use ages in five year intervals only. We only allow for a
single quote per company per age/term-combination. Since the records include several instances of
multiple quotes from the same company for different states—though prices usually coincide—we
average over these quotes. All in all, we rely on 7,688 different quotes in our estimation process.
Figures 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) plot the quotes by term in April 2012, for age 25 and 40, respectively.
For each risk class, the variance of insurance prices for each term is about the same and the co-
efficient of variation decreases as the term increases. This goes against the intuition of stochastic
mortality because it would imply an increasing variation in mortality (and likely insurance prices)
as the term increases. Similar characteristics of the variance of the insurance prices are observed
in the other calendar years and ages.
(a) Term life insurance quotes for age 25 in April 2012 (b) Term life insurance quotes for age 40 in April 2012
Figure 3.1: Illustration of the insurance price data
In addition to the parameters of the mortality model, the GMM estimator depends on various
business-related parameters. The CSVs kC
(i,j,h)
x,n , k ≥ 0, are calculated according to the NAIC
Standard Nonforfeiture Law for Life Insurance. The interest rates derive from Moody’s Corporate
Bond Yield Averages Index (we refer to Towers Watson (2015) for details and an illustration of the
relevant rates), and the relevant mortality rates are taken from the Commissioners Standard Ordi-
nary (CSO) 2017 mortality table (mandatory in 48 U.S. states and optional in all 50; see American
Academy of Actuaries (2008)). We do not include expense, surrender and other business-related
parameters in the minimization, but rather fix them according to Table 3.1, whose column 2 and 3
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list their values and the source, respectively.4
Parameter Value Source
c
(1)
IP 60% Avg. values from the 2005
c
(2)
IP $882.5 “Generally Recognized Expense Table”
cM $45 (see e.g. Society of Actuaries (2004))
T¯ 18 years Avg. value from Society of Actuaries (2007)
γ 60% Value matched to CSO 2017 mort. table
qi 15%, i ≤ 3, Roughly matches pattern (non-renewable)
5%, i > 3 according to Purushotham (2006)
Table 3.1: Parameters relevant to the insurance contracts.
For the numerical optimization in (3.7), we rely on the Julia language and apply the COBYLA
(constrained optimization by linear approximation) algorithm, suitable for a minimization task with
a large number of equality and inequality constraints of the parameters. For the numerical solution
of the ordinary differential equations arising in each time step, we rely on an implementation of
the Runge-Kutta method with a variable time step as available within Julia (ode45).
We estimate five versions of the model. The first model version (Full model) includes catas-
trophe component parameters (κ, λ and ζ). In the second version (w/o CAT), we exclude the
catastrophe component. In the third model (w/o Sigma), we assume that the stochastic diffusion
parameter σ is zero. In the fourth model (w/o Trend), we set the trend parameters α, β1, and β3
to zero so that Yt is fixed at β2. The fifth model (w/o Co. effect) takes away company effects
from the “w/o CAT” model. We record the estimates, standard errors, and also a likelihood-like
J -statistics, which is the basis for testing the overall specification and parametric restrictions as in
Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982). It is calculated as follows:
J = Nx,n
[
1
Nx,n
Nx,n∑
x,n
f(θˆ, P (i,j,h)x,n )
]′
(i,j,h)
W (θˆ)
[
1
Nx,n
Nx,n∑
x,n
f(θˆ, P (i,j,h)x,n )
]
(i,j,h)
.
J , a Wald statistic, converges in distribution to χ2(L−K) under the null hypothesis that the model
4Including them in the estimation procedure leads to problems when including a complex mortality model, since the impact on
insurance prices is similar to those originating from certain components. We obtain reasonable magnitudes not too different from
the set values in the context of simple mortality models.
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is valid, or well-specified, where L is the number of moment equations and K is the number of
parameters. In terms of testing parametric restrictions, according to Newey and West (1987), the
difference of two J -statistics, the GMM counterpart to the likelihood ratio test statistic, converges
in distribution to χ2(K1 − K2), where K1 − K2 is the number of restricted parameters in model
2 compared to model 1. This “Likelihood-ratio-like” statistic can be used to test the parameter
restrictions and offer guidance to model comparison, which is highlighted in the next part.
3.3.3 Results and Discussion
Table 3.2 provides the parameter estimates for all five model versions, with the first four having the
company effect parameters. In the Full model, the catastrophe parameter estimates (κ, λ, ζ) have
large standard errors and are not significant, so do the trend parameter β1 and diffusion parameter
σ. In contrast, the trend parameter β2 and Gompertz parameter b are significant, pointing to a
simple deterministic mortality model. Parameters related to selection/underwriting effect (c, τ ,
γ) are significant in the first four model estimations, highlighting such effects in life insurance
underwriting.
The estimation results for company effects are shown in Figure 3.2(a). Note that estimations
of company effects in all models yield similar results, so we illustrate the company effects using
the estimates in “w/o Trend” model. Figure 3.2(c) summarizes the significance of the estimates
compared to zero and we find around one third of companies having mortality rates significantly
above the industry average, and around one third of companies having mortality rates significantly
below the average. In the fifth model, without the company effects capturing the heterogeneity of
mortality, parameter estimates turn out to have large standard errors and the overall specification
statistic J is much larger compared to the other four models, indicating that the “w/o Co. effect”
model is unlikely to be favorable. The estimation results strongly favor the model with company
effects, which overshadow the mortality catastrophe and diffusion parameters.
We conduct model comparisons using the difference of J statistics as discussed in the previous
subsection. Figure 3.3 shows the value of the statistics (referred to as “LR”) between models, with
arrows pointing toward the more favorable model. Table 3.3 shows the hypothesis testing results at
significance level 95%. The results suggest strong rejection of the “w/o Co. effect” model, again
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(a) Estimated company effect for 31 companies (b) Histogram of company effect estimates
(c) Company effect estimates and their significance to zero at 95%
confidence level (red lines serve as visual aid only and are not clas-
sification boundaries)
Figure 3.2: Company effect in three representations
highlighting the importance of including the company heterogeneity in the model. Among the four
models with company effects, we always fail to reject a simpler model with fewer parameters. As a
result, the preferred specification turns out to be the “w/o Trend” model, which has a simple deter-
ministic Gompertz mortality component and selection effect. These results suggest that company
effects matter while the catastrophe components and the stochastic diffusion are not important in
explaining the prices.
It is important to note that the estimated mortality rates correspond to mortality rates used in
pricing, and they may entail aggregated risk adjustments (as expectations under a risk-neutral mea-
sure). Hence, we do not propose these mortality rates adequately project population mortality, also
because they correspond to a special subpopulation, or that mortality catastrophes and stochasticity
are not relevant in forecasting population mortality. Rather, our estimation results and the model
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of the model specifications
comparisons point towards the relevance of company effects in life insurance pricing, whereas
other aspects (mortality catastrophes, stochastic trends) do not seem to be of key relevance.
The distribution of the company effects takes a roughly tri-modal shape as shown in Figure
3.2(b), with several companies bunching at positive effects (worse mortality experience) of around
0.1, some companies bunching around 0 (average mortality experience), and some companies
bunching at negative effects (better mortality experience) of around -0.1, also seen in Figure 3.2(c).
The results suggests that there are roughly three segments in the market.
We retrieve information from A.M. Best to check whether these groups can be explained by
company characteristics. More precisely, from A.M. Best Rating/Information Services, we obtain
company ratings and company size (two companies’ information are not available). Here, financial
strength rating means A.M. Best’s independent opinion of “an insurer’s financial strength and
ability to meet its ongoing insurance policy and contract obligations” and issuer credit rating refers
to A.M. Best’s independent opinion of “an entity’s ability to meet its ongoing financial obligations.”
Table 3.4 provides the information together with the company effects from our estimation. More
precisely, we code the companies according to the three segments, -,o,+, belonging to the group
with negative, insignificant, and positive company effects, respectively.
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There are no obvious relationships to company size or company ratings. There are very highly
rated companies and very large companies in each segment, and there are smaller and relatively
low-rated companies in each segment. In other words, company characteristics do not seem to ex-
plain the market segmentation—or, more generally, the significant heterogeneity in prices. Thus,
it appears that differences in the pools of policyholders between companies must lead to the seg-
mentation.
These differences in the mortality profile of each company’s portfolio of policies may arise from
different channels. First, underwriting criteria, and particularly the categorization of individuals
with a certain health history to rating classes, differ among carriers. Since in the end the mortality
experience is driven by morbidity rates and cause-specific mortality rates, and since these in aggre-
gate shape the mortality profile of the relevant pool, heterogeneity may arise (Boumezoued et al.,
2017; Arnold and Sherris, 2016, and references therein). Moreover, different companies penetrate
different regions dissimilarly and they use different distribution channels, which in turn affect the
demographic and socio-economic distribution of policyholders. Since there are large differences
in mortality across different subpopulations (Case and Deaton, 2015; Chetty et al., 2016), again
these aspects may generate heterogeneity in company mortality profiles.
3.3.4 Robustness: Time Period and Market Segment
In the estimation process, we rely on insurance price data for different ages and different terms
for the years 2012-2015. In particular, we use insurance quotes with terms of up to 30 years, so
that the relevant mortality experience for ex-post companies profits spans the period 2012-2045
(when the 30-year term policies sold in 2015 mature). To evaluate whether our results are driven
by idiosyncrasies of insurance prices in recent (post financial crisis) years, Figure 7 illustrates term
life quotes issued in January 2006 (panel 3.4(b)) relative to the quotes from 2012 (panel 3.4(a)).
We observe that the general pattern across companies is similar. In particular, although the 2006
quotes for term 30 are somewhat less dispersed, the insurance prices still exhibit a significant
variance across companies, which is indicative of the relevance of company effects.
While the 2006 quotes by themselves do not allow for an estimation of company effects, esti-
mating model versions without company effects results in similar parameter estimates as the “w/o
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(a) Term life insurance quotes in April 2012 (b) Term life insurance quotes in April 2006
Figure 3.4: Illustration of the insurance price data for age 40, male, non-smoker, regular, $500,000 face
value
Co. effects” model for the 2012-2015 time period (last column in Table 3.2). In particular, the
catastrophe, the stochastic diffusion, and the trend parameters are all insignificant, and the data
strongly favors the simple model.
To illustrate that the results here are not likely to carry over to other life-contingent product
classes such as annuities or pension products, Figure 3.5 taken from Bauer (2008) shows annuity
quotes in the UK market. More precisely, the figure depicts the evolution of annual annuity rates
for a purchase price £10,000 within open market option between January 2000 and December
2005, payable monthly in advance and without guarantee period, for leading companies in UK.
Figure 3.5: Monthly British annuity rates data from January 2000 (0) to December 2005 (70), open market
option, male, age 60, purchase price £10,000
Here, the findings appear to be quite different. In contrast to our term insurance quotes, the
annuity rates throughout the period show a relatively small variance at any point of time, and the
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relative order between the companies changes throughout the observation period. This suggests
that unlike our estimation results for term insurance prices, there are no persistent company effects
in this market.
These differences may not come as a surprise given the differences between the market seg-
ments. In the annuities market, there is no underwriting process (Hoermann and Ruß, 2008) so that
companies cannot actively control their portfolio. Life annuities cannot be surrendered, so that pol-
icy lapsation/surrender is not relevant. Moreover, the full price is paid upfront so that the contracts
are fully and solely exposed to longevity risk. In particular, Lin and Cox (2005) and Bauer et al.
(2010) rely on annuity for deriving a (usually positive) “market price of longevity risk” implied by
life annuity prices.
3.4 Conclusion
Our study of term life insurance prices goes against the common perception that life insurance is
fairly homogeneous and that aggregate mortality trends are highly relevant in this marketplace.
Our estimates do not reflect significance of mortality catastrophe or stochastic mortality trends.
The model comparison strongly rejects the model without company specific mortality effects, how-
ever, pointing to a significant heterogeneity in the mortality profiles among different life insurance
companies. Thus, “basis risk” seems to dominate systematic mortality risk in life insurance. This
questions the efficiency of so-called “natural hedging” of longevity risk using life insurance expo-
sure. Furthermore, it points to the relevance of understanding granular mortality trends.
Aside from explanations on the supply side, it is possible that demand-side effects contribute
to our findings. For instance, companies may be able to sell overpriced insurance to existing
customers in other business lines, or carriers may pursue certain segments of the market by their
pricing strategy. We leave exploring these angles for future research.
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Full w/o CAT w/o Sigma w/o Trend w/o Co. effects
α 1.8793 1.8176 1.8178 - 1.3609
(6.1387) (1.2603) (1.2613) - (13.7273)
β1 2.4470 2.4440 2.4446 - 2.6631
(10.5424) (2.2557) (2.2593) - (50.4369)
β2 1.20E-06 1.20E-06 1.20E-06 1.09E-06 1.01E-06
(5.58E-08) (5.99E-08) (6.00E-08) (5.90E-08) (2.64E-06)
σ 0.0002 0.0004 - - 0.0002
(1.4153) (0.4272) - - (98.2278)
b 0.1015 0.1018 0.1017 0.1027 0.0439
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0383)
κ 2.2554 - - - -
(76.0239) - - - -
λ 0.0007 - - - -
(0.0043) - - - -
ζ 19.4661 - - - -
(367.7243) - - - -
β3 2.15E-06 2.15E-06 2.15E-06 - 3.87E-06
(1.60E-06) (8.24E-07) (8.24E-07) - (2.33E-05)
c 0.0047 0.0047 0.0046 0.0047 0.0057
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (6.00E-05) (0.0001)
γ 0.9628 0.9606 0.9603 0.9372 0.9603
(0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0073) (0.0073)
τ 3.00E-07 3.00E-07 3.00E-07 3.10E-07 3.53E-07
(1.06E-07) (1.13E-07) (1.13E-07) (1.14E-07) (4.52E-06)
Y0 3.35E-06 3.35E-06 3.35E-06 1.09E-06 4.88E-06
(1.60E-06) (8.26E-07) (8.26E-07) (5.90E-08) (2.34E-05)
Ecoi Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Erc1 0.3652 0.3651 0.3651 0.3652 0.3747
(0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0110)
Eyear2012 0.0131 0.0130 0.0130 0.0129 0.0148
(0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0127) (0.0155)
Eyear2013 -0.0043 -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0043 -0.0037
(0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0153)
Eyear2014 0.0172 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0183
(0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0126) (0.0155)
J-stat 33.0087 38.5897 38.5755 35.3664 112.6926
df 202 205 206 209 235
Table 3.2: Estimated parameters (company effect estimates not shown) for four models based on GMM.
Standard errors for each parameter are shown in parentheses.
H0 H1 Reject H0 at 95% confidence?
w/o CAT Full No
w/o Sigma w/o CAT No
w/o Sigma Full No
w/o Trend w/o Sigma No
w/o Trend w/o CAT No
w/o Trend Full No
w/o Co. effect w/o CAT Yes
w/o Co. effect Full Yes
Table 3.3: Model comparison results
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Company Effect Financial Strength Rating Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating Financial Size Category
- A- (Excellent) a- (Excellent) X ($250 mil ∼ $500 mil)
- A (Excellent) a+ (Excellent) XV (>$2 billion)
o A (Excellent) a+ (Excellent) XIV ($1.5 bil ∼ $2 bil)
+ A- (Excellent) a- (Excellent) IX ($250 mil ∼ $500 mil)
- A+ (Superior) aa- (Superior) IX ($250 mil ∼ $500 mil)
- - - -
- A (Excellent) a+ (Excellent) VIII ($100 mil ∼ $250 mil)
+ A+ (Superior) aa- (Superior) XV (>$2 billion)
o A- (Excellent) a- (Excellent) VIII ($100 mil ∼ $250 mil)
+ A++ (Superior) aa+ (Superior) XV (>$2 billion)
+ A- (Excellent) a- (Excellent) VIII ($100 mil ∼ $250 mil)
- A+ (Superior) aa- (Superior) XV (>$2 billion)
o A (Excellent) a+ (Excellent) XV (>$2 billion)
o A+ (Superior) aa- (Superior) XV (>$2 billion)
+ A- (Excellent) a- (Excellent) VII ($50 mil ∼ $100 mil)
o - - -
+ A+ (Superior) aa- (Superior) XV (>$2 billion)
- A+ (Superior) aa- (Superior) XV (>$2 billion)
o A+ (Superior) aa- (Superior) XV (>$2 billion)
- A+ (Superior) aa- (Superior) XV (>$2 billion)
o A+ (Superior) aa- (Superior) XV (>$2 billion)
- A (Excellent) a+ (Excellent) VIII ($100 mil ∼ $250 mil)
o A+ (Superior) aa- (Superior) XV (>$2 billion)
+ A- (Excellent) a- (Excellent) VIII ($100 mil ∼ $250 mil)
+ A (Excellent) a+ (Excellent) XV (>$2 billion)
o A++ (Superior) aaa (Exceptional) XV (>$2 billion)
o A+ (Superior) aa- (Superior) XV (>$2 billion)
o A+ (Superior) aa- (Superior) XV (>$2 billion)
+ A+ (Superior) aa- (Superior) XV (>$2 billion)
+ A+ (Superior) aa (Superior) XV (>$2 billion)
- A+ (Superior) aa- (Superior) IX ($250 mil ∼ $500 mil)
Table 3.4: Company effects vs. A.M. Best ratings and company size (-,o,+, belonging to the group with
negative, insignificant, and positive company effects, respectively)
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